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Executive summary
A resource boom has been underway in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
since 2003.
The boom is driven by four factors — improved African investment 
climates, strong international commodity demand and soaring commodity 
prices, a global savings glut, and a ‘New Great Game’ of rivalry for 
resources played by state-owned and state-directed resource companies 
backed by the exchequers and diplomatic clout of their governments.
Australian resource companies and companies that service the 
resource sector fi gure prominently in that boom — thanks to their 
competitive advantages. From very little at the turn of the decade, 
actual and prospective investment by Australian companies in the 
SSA resource sector has climbed to US$20 billion — close to the A$26 
billion stock of direct investment that the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
estimates Australian resident mining companies held throughout the 
world in 2006 (though overseas affi liates would have held further 
overseas investments).
With each passing month, moreover, the number grows bigger. BHP 
Billiton alone plans to invest US$4.7 billion in coming years. Australian 
companies are now the third-largest spenders on exploration in Africa 
after South African and Canadian ones. The big Australian mining 
engineering companies now make a substantial fraction of their sales 
from African projects and have lined up work on at least a further 
A$4 billion worth of projects. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Just as many stories about the world economy nowadays have China 
or ‘Chindia’ as protagonists, so does the story of the SSA resource boom. 
Both China and India feature prominently on both the demand and 
supply side of the resource boom — pushing demand and prices up, and 
then going into SSA to try to supply their own, and other countries’, 
demands. Though China, as a latecomer to SSA resource investment, 
isn’t yet one of the biggest investors, its lending and investment 
‘pipeline’ suggests it could well leap to the forefront in coming years.
So far, the global credit squeeze and sharemarket correction have had 
only a marginal impact on fi nancing of SSA resource projects. Many of 
the longer-term structural drivers of SSA resource investment — brisk 
international commodity demand, ample capital, and non-commercial 
activity by state-owned and state-directed companies — look durable. 
Therefore the investment does, too.  
But it could well fi zzle out if the subcontinent doesn’t hold on to 
and build upon the peace, democracy and economic improvements it 
has achieved this decade. Since it seems almost as liable to slip back 
as to move forward, one shouldn’t take continuing investment and 
development for granted.
For all the confl ict resolution, democratisation and economic 
improvement that has taken place in SSA this decade, it remains an 
inhospitable place to do business. ‘Political risk events’ have already 
blindsided several companies, including Woodside in Mauritania and 
Anvil Mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
Political risk isn’t exactly foreign to Australian resource companies. 
After all, they were in some inhospitable spots even before the current 
push into SSA got underway.  Even so, there are likely to be some risks 
to which they will need to adjust. The New Great Game is one. Some 
governments are striving to achieve energy and resource security by 
acquiring African resources without too much regard to cost. In the 
competition for concessions and contracts, they are offering soft loans, 
aid and infrastructure. Companies without such advantages will fi nd 
themselves competing on unequal terms.
Other risks common in, if not peculiar to, SSA are political violence, 
attendant human rights abuses, corruption and creeping expropriation. 
These can lead to direct costs, such as damaged assets, lost production 
and criminal penalties for bribery and corruption. Or indirect costs 
(via ‘reputational risk’), such as media and NGO criticism and share 
divestments by ‘ethical’ investors. Either way, shareholder value can 
be destroyed.
Protecting one’s assets and reputation from these risks while still 
making money is diffi cult. Companies are managing the risks in three 
ways — through corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies, political 
risk assessment and political risk insurance (PRI).
Most companies have some form of CSR policy. They can adopt 
external codes and benchmarks. Four important ones are the Equator 
Principles used by banks (ANZ, National Australia Bank and Westpac 
among them), the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (and associated Risk 
Awareness Tool for Multinational Enterprises in Weak Governance 
Zones), and the International Council on Mining & Metals’ Sustainable 
Development Principles. Some companies devise their own principles. 
Some mix both.
PRI tends to be used by the banks providing debt and hedge facilities 
to resource projects. Equity investors frequently self-insure, confi dent 
that they can manage the risk and are being well rewarded for it. Their 
shareholders don’t mind, because they can hedge individual company 
risks by blending shares into a diversifi ed portfolio.
Ultimately, the best defence a company can mount against political 
risk is to ensure a fair sharing of benefi ts between the company, the local 
community and the national government. It should come as no surprise 
to companies if one-sided contracts are challenged and renegotiated.
There may be a case for recalibrating Australian public policies at 
the margin because of the push by Australian companies into the SSA 
resource sector. The three big areas of foreign, trade and aid policy may 
need to be reviewed, as well as the leverage and infl uence that Canberra 
can exercise through international organisations such as the IMF, 
World Bank, UN, OECD, WTO and Berne Union (the international 
association that counts amongst its members most offi cial export credit 
agencies). Five initiatives suggest themselves for review. 
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• Providing political and diplomatic support to companies suffering 
unfair treatment or competition, perhaps partly through some 
additional diplomatic posts 
• Negotiating with African governments bilateral investment 
treaties that contain protections for Australian investors and 
dispute settlement mechanisms
• Supplying bilateral aid to targeted SSA countries  to win goodwill 
that would support Australian commercial interests
• Urging and helping SSA governments to improve their investment 
climates and to treat all investors in a non-discriminatory 
manner  
• Urging and helping governments engaged in strategic competition 
for resources to sign on to and honour international agreements, 
such as those in the OECD, WTO and Berne Union, limiting the 
subsidisation of exports and investment.
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Preface
At the turn of the decade, trade and investment ties between Australia 
and Africa were negligible. South Africa was Australia’s No. 1 export 
market and investment destination in SSA, yet still ranked only 
21 among merchandise trade partners and made up only 0.14% of 
total Australian overseas investment in 2001-02. A host of factors 
inhibited ties, including non-complementary economies and distance, 
both geographic and cultural. In Africa, the inhibitors included poor 
purchasing power and infrastructure, tariff barriers, investment 
restrictions and political risk.
Yet in the past fi ve years, investment by Australian resource companies 
in SSA has been growing in leaps and bounds. Actual and prospective 
investment by Australian companies in the SSA resource sector has 
climbed to US$20 billion. And it seems a lot more could bubble up. 
A recent illustration of how SSA now matters a lot for even the 
biggest Australian companies is the takeover bid by BHP Billiton 
for Rio Tinto. In its attempts to ward off this bid, Rio noted that 
the market had insuffi ciently valued its Simandou iron ore deposit 
in Guinea. According to Rio, if the deposit were valued correctly, 
the company’s market capitalisation would exceed the value of BHP 
Billiton’s takeover offer. This ‘globally signifi cant iron ore province’, 
costing an estimated US$6 billion to develop, is ‘comparable in many 
respects to the Pilbara 40 years ago, which explains our excitement 
as we draw closer to the development phase,’ Rio’s iron ore boss said. 
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• Chapter 2 outlines the dimensions of the boom — the money 
going into oil and gas and hard-rock minerals, exploration versus 
development, the geographic distribution, and so forth. 
• Chapter 3 reviews the dimensions of Australian involvement 
in the boom — oil/gas versus hard-rock minerals, exploration 
versus development, investment versus services, juniors versus 
majors, sources of capital, geographic spread etc.
• Chapter 4 analyses the sustainability of the investment and 
production. Are they durable? Or a fl ash in the pan? It then 
ponders the corporate and public policy implications of this 
activity.
Yet in June 2008, the Guinean government saw fi t to ‘withdraw’ 
and ‘reconsider’ Rio’s Simandou concession, possibly with a view 
to extracting more favourable terms.1 That an iron ore deposit in a 
remote corner of Guinea – a country most Australians would have 
diffi culty fi nding on the map – could so infl uence the prospects 
for a takeover that would represent a major consolidation in the 
international mining industry was certainly a situation no one 
would have predicted fi ve years ago. 
Alongside direct investors, Australian engineering and service 
companies have been busy clinching contracts. Many of these already 
make serious money from Africa, in one case as much as 42% of 
sales revenue.2 
Australian resource investment in SSA used to be focused on South 
Africa and Mozambique. But recently companies have fanned out north 
and west. They can now be found in numerous countries including: 
Angola, Burkina Faso, the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea, 
Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Zambia.
What accounts for the recent upsurge in investment and activity? 
Obviously the international resource boom is one driver. But this factor 
alone can’t explain the rush. After all, previous commodity booms 
passed Africa by. 
So what are the drivers of the African resource boom? The dimensions 
of the boom — the stocks and fl ows of investment, the commodities 
and countries involved? How do Australian companies feature? Is 
the investment and production sustainable? What implications does 
the push by Australia companies into the subcontinent have for the 
companies themselves? And for Australian public policy?
Structure of the paper
The purpose of this paper is to answer these questions.
• Chapter 1 examines the main drivers of Africa’s natural resource 
boom.
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Chapter 1
Drivers of  the boom
There are four trends driving the current resources boom in SSA — 
improved African ‘fundamentals’, ‘stronger for longer’ international 
commodity prices, a global savings glut, and a ‘New Great Game’ 
of strategic competition on the subcontinent between state-backed 
companies. The fi rst is providing more congenial local conditions for 
investors; the second, rewarding prices at which to sell production; 
the third, cheap, plentiful and ‘fearless’ capital with which to 
bankroll projects; and the fourth, an additional impetus besides profi t 
for investment.
Improved African ‘fundamentals’
As one observer recently noted:
For decades after independence, countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa suffered from civil strife and ‘stop-go’ economic 
policies that led to macroeconomic instability and high 
infl ation. Roads, railways, ports, and electricity systems 
fell into disrepair. Nor was the external environment 
always co-operative: countries were exposed to drought, 
INTO AFRICA
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Macroeconomic stabilisation
GDP growth in SSA has been clearly higher on average, and infl ation 
lower, this decade than in the 1980s and 1990s, although by worldwide 
standards infl ation is still high, and it remains to be seen whether growth 
will be sustained in the face of setbacks to world economic growth and 
commodity prices (Figure 1.1). Interestingly, the IMF, in its January 
2008 World Economic Outlook update, forecasts growth for Africa of 
7.0% in 2008, compared with 6.0% in 2007. For all other regions, it 
forecasts lower growth in 2008. In the Fund’s view, only Africa will be 
able to defy the world economic slowdown now underway.4
Fewer bullets, more ballots
Undoubtedly helping countries achieve greater macroeconomic stability 
has been a trend towards confl ict resolution and democratisation. 
The most important milestone on the road to peace has been the 
ending of civil war in Zaire, later to become the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (DRC). According to the International Rescue Committee, 
this war and its aftermath has killed 5.4 million people, mostly from 
disease and starvation, making it the deadliest confl ict since World War 
II. While inter-communal violence continues to happen in the DRC, 
and commodity prices fl uctuated. Countries that were rich 
in natural resources such as oil, gold, copper, and diamonds 
were often subject to the ‘resource curse’ that left large 
numbers of their people worse off. External donors, 
while supporting the continent, did not always fi nance 
projects that would have adequate economic returns or 
that responded to local development needs. In country 
after country, debt mounted until it became unsustainable. On 
top of all that, Africa was besieged by malaria and HIV/AIDS, 
which had devastating economic as well as human effects.
Yet things seem to be changing for the better throughout 
the subcontinent. In most African countries, leaders are 
now selected through democratic elections. The decision-
making process is becoming more participatory and 
involving greater segments of civil society. The number of 
countries in crisis has declined, although confl ict persists 
in some countries and regions. The pursuit of strong 
macroeconomic policies and economic reforms is bearing 
fruit: economies are growing faster and more steadily than 
before, and infl ation is falling. Record levels of reserves 
in both oil-producing and oil-importing countries act as a 
cushion against external shocks, such as the recent increase 
in oil prices. Countries pursuing economic reforms have 
benefi ted from unprecedented amounts of debt relief from 
a wide variety of sources. In addition, the international 
community has promised a signifi cant scaling up of aid 
resources in the years to come, offering African countries 
a fresh chance to free up resources and invest in human 
and fi xed capital to promote sustainable growth.
These changes have not gone unnoticed abroad. Foreign 
investors are showing increased interest in the African 
continent, both in the domestic debt markets and in direct 
investment in the extraction of natural resources.3
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Sub-Saharan Africa – growth and inflation
Annual % change Annual % change
Real GDP (LHS)
Inflation (RHS)
Source: IMF World Economic Database. 2008 and 2009 are forecasts.
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the trend of improving security: Kenya is East Africa’s largest 
economy and SSA’s fourth largest. Recent disruptions to the port 
of Mombasa have had regional repercussions, because Mombasa 
is the cheif point of transit for exports and imports of the 
landlocked countries in Kenya’s hinterland — Uganda, Burundi, 
eastern DRC, northern Tanzania and southern Sudan.
Despite these reversals, however, the current level of bloodshed on the 
subcontinent is well down on a decade ago.
Political and civil liberties are also spreading throughout the 
subcontinent, if fi tfully. According to Freedom House, a monitor of 
freedom and democracy around the world, Africa up to 2005 had 
seen ‘several years of steady and, in a few cases, impressive gains for 
democracy’. While in 2006 and 2007 it experienced more setbacks than 
gains, in a longer term perspective, the situation is now much improved. 
In 1973, three-quarters of SSA states were ‘Not Free’ and only two out of 
the then 39 countries were ‘Free’, according to Freedom House. In 2007, 
by contrast, 11 countries were ‘Free’, 23% of the total; compared with 23 
countries (48%) ‘Partly Free’ and 14 countries (29%) ‘Not Free’.8
The peace and democracy dividend shows up in World Bank rankings 
of SSA countries for political stability and violence (Table 1.1)9. The 
numbers indicate a country’s worldwide percentile ranking — the lower 
the score, the worse the situation. The tables show countries that have 
either risen or fallen at least 10 percentile rankings over 1996-2006. True, 
they show that almost as many countries have gone backwards —12 — 
as have gone forward — 13. But of the sliding countries, only Ivory 
Coast, Mali and Zimbabwe are large (in GDP or population). In contrast, 
10 of the rising countries are either among the top 10 SSA countries for 
GDP or among the top 20 for population, or both — Angola, Burkina 
Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Guinea, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, 
South Africa and Zambia. Even more importantly, virtually every one 
of the improvers is a resource-rich country of interest to mining and 
petroleum companies. In the future, some other large and resource-
rich countries offer promise of improvement, even if they haven’t yet 
delivered — the DRC is a prime example.
its scale is much reduced following the signing of a peace agreement 
between the government and rebel forces in 2002.5
Other notable developments include the ending of the civil wars 
in Mozambique (1992), Sierra Leone (2001), Angola (2002), Liberia 
(2003), Ivory Coast (2004) and Sudan (2005), and progress towards 
ending civil war in Uganda (2006).
Islamic political activism also seems to have decreased in West Africa 
following a brief upsurge in 2000-02. This seems to be the case even 
in semi-Islamised political systems like Nigeria’s and Mauritania’s, 
although the Algeria-based Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb movement 
does continue to stage terrorist attacks, including against foreigners.6 
Alongside this lack of activism is a high level of popularity for 
America: a poll by the Pew Research Center released in June 2007 found 
that 61% of Nigerians polled, and 69% of Senegalese, had a favourable 
view of America.7 
 More peaceful though it may now be, Africa remains the most blood-
soaked continent. Worse, it seems almost as liable to slip back into 
confl ict as to move forward to greater security. Insurrections or wars 
continue to plague Nigeria, Chad, the Central African Republic, Sudan 
and Somalia. Just recently, there have been three setbacks. 
• Nigeria. After talks between the government and militants in 
the Niger Delta broke down in December 2007, fi ghting has 
escalated signifi cantly in Africa’s largest oil province. (Actually, 
such have been the production shortfalls caused by the fi ghting 
that in April, according to OPEC, Angola overtook Nigeria as 
SSA’s No. 1 oil producer.)
• Chad. A renewed outbreak of fi ghting between rebels and the 
Chadian government occurred in January. A measure of calm 
has returned following a French intervention, but the underlying 
causes of the instability remain.
• Kenya. Meanwhile, in Kenya, inter-ethnic violence set off by the 
contested election in December 2007 represents a big setback to 
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To date, 25 African countries have secured debt reduction packages 
under the so-called IMF/World Bank HIPC Initiative (HIPC = Highly 
Indebted Poor Country) (Table 1.2). This gives them interim relief on 
debt service falling due to offi cial bilateral creditors, and eventually, if 
they ‘behave well’, a large write-down of their debt stocks. On average, 
Table 1.1: Improvements in peace and stability
Countries becoming more 
stable/less violent
Countries becoming less 
stable/more violent
Percentile 
rankings
Percentile 
rankings
Country 1996 2006 Country 1996 2006
Algeria 1.9 19.2 Benin 82.2 59.1
Angola 3.4 28.8 Central African Rep 37.5 7.2
Botswana 70.7 93.3 Chad 22.1 5.8
Cameroon 11.5 38.5 Comoros 82.2 41.8
Gabon 32.7 48.6 Djibouti 51.0 39.4
Ghana 38.5 54.8 Eritrea 53.4 20.7
Libya 6.7 55.3 Ivory Coast 39.4 2.9
Mozambique 19.2 64.4 Lesotho 62.0 51.9
Namibia 60.1 75.5 Mali 64.4 45.2
Rwanda 4.8 27.4 Mauritania 62 35.6
Sierra Leone 2.9 31.3 São Tomé & Principe 82.2 63.9
South Africa 13.5 44.2 Zimbabwe 25.5 13.9
Zambia 28.8 56.7
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Bank governance indicators
Debt reduction 
Thanks to debt relief and better economic management, external debt 
burdens are also down across much of the subcontinent (see Figures 
1.2 and 1.3).
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Sub-Saharan Africa – external debt burden
Source: IMF World Economic Database. 2008 and 2009 are forecasts.
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Sub-Saharan Africa – external debt service burden
Source: IMF World Economic Database. 2008 and 2009 are forecasts.
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Surprisingly perhaps, given the poor governance and high levels of 
corruption dogging many countries, money freed up from debt service 
by the HIPC and MDRI Initiatives has by and large found its way 
into health, education and other social services – not into Swiss bank 
accounts or increased military spending. According to the IMF, before 
the HIPC Initiative, eligible countries were, on average, spending slightly 
more on debt service than on health and education. But now they are, 
on average, spending more than fi ve times the amount of debt service 
payments.10
Maiden credit ratings
The reduction in debt and improvement in macroeconomic policy 
discipline has enabled a clutch of countries to gain maiden sovereign 
credit ratings. With fi nancial support from the US State Department, 
ratings agency Fitch began to rate the subcontinent in 2002, and the UN 
Development Program has been doing something similar with Standard 
& Poor’s since 2003.11 Twenty countries in the subcontinent now have 
ratings (Table 1.3).
Only four countries — Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa 
— have the coveted investment-grade rating, making them ‘safe for widows 
and orphans’ to invest in. The rest have speculative grade ratings, meaning 
that if they were to issue international bonds, they would be viewed as 
‘junk’, suitable only for sophisticated, risk-hungry investors. 
Most rated countries don’t, at this stage, intend to use their ratings to 
tap international capital markets. Their plan instead is to provide a set of 
signposts to direct investors and their fi nanciers about the quality of their 
business and investment climate, and hopefully, win upgrades over time. 
Interestingly, however, two countries did successfully issue large 
Eurobonds in 2007 — and after the onset of the global credit squeeze. 
Gabon issued a US$1 billion bond in December, and Ghana, a US$750 
million bond in September. Gabon’s bond was reportedly two and a half 
times oversubscribed; Ghana’s four times.12
HIPC benefi ciaries have seen their debt service payments decline by 
about 2% of GDP between 1999 and 2005.
Moreover, of the 25 HIPC benefi ciaries, 18 have benefi ted from 
additional debt write-offs from multilateral institutions under the so-
called Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI).
Table 1.2: Sub-Saharan African HIPC benefi ciaries at end-2007
Recipients of full, irrevocable HIPC debt relief 1
Benin Malawi Senegal
Burkina Faso Mali Sierr Leone
Cameroon Mauritania Tanzania
Ethiopia Mozambique Uganda
The Gambia Niger Zambia
Ghana Rwanda
Madagascar São Tomé & Principe
Recipients of interim HIPC relief
Burundi Congo, Republic of Guinea-Bissau
Chad DRC
Central African 
Republic
Guinea
Potential HIPC benefi ciaries
Comoros Liberia Togo
Eritrea Somalia
Ivory Coast Sudan
1 These countries are also benefi ciaries of the Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative (MDRI)
Source: IMF HIPC and MDRI
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Better institutional quality
Another set of benchmarks worth noting are those measuring 
‘institutional quality’. Scholars and investors alike have long recognised 
that not just macroeconomic stability and external creditworthiness, 
but the quality of a country’s institutions more broadly, matter for its 
attractiveness as an investment destination. 
In this context, the World Bank’s IDA Resource Allocation Index 
(RAI) and associated Country Performance Rating (CPR) are of 
particular interest.13 RAIs and CPRs are used by IDA (the World Bank’s 
soft loan window, the International Development Association) to 
allocate funds among borrowing members. They have been calculated in 
one form or another since the late 1970s, but until 2006 had been kept 
confi dential. However, their release in June 2006 attracted attention 
because they represent a particularly painstaking and comprehensive 
approach to measuring institutional quality (see Box 1).
While the subcontinent has only three countries in the top 10 of rated 
countries, in contrast to nine in the bottom 10, its average score, 2.6, is 
only a touch off the overall average, 2.85 (Table 1.4). The World Bank 
hasn’t published the scores it gave before June 2006, but it is clear that 
the performance gap would have been much larger a decade before.
Box 1: World Bank Country Performance Ratings
The current rating system uses 16 indicators in four clusters 
— economic management, structural policies, social inclusion 
and public sector institutions. Each variable is rated on a scale 
from one (low) to six (high). The fi gures are then averaged for 
each cluster and then averaged again to give an overall RAI 
for a country. The RAI is then adjusted to take into account 
the performance of the country’s IDA project portfolio and its 
governance. 
These adjustments then yield the CPR.
Table 1.3: Sub-Saharan African sovereign credit ratings
Long-term foreign currency ratings
Standard & 
Poor’s
Fitch Moody’s
Benin B B –
Botswana A – A2
Burkina Faso B – –
Cameroon B B –
Cape Verde – B+ –
Gabon – BB- –
Gambia – – –
Ghana B+ B+ –
Kenya B – –
Lesotho – BB- –
Madagascar B – –
Malawi – – –
Mali B B- -
Mauritius – – Baa2
Mozambique B+ B -
Namibia – BBB- -
Nigeria BB- BB-
Senegal B+ – -
South Africa BBB+ BBB+ Baa1
Uganda – B -
Source: Standard & Poor’s, Fitch and Moody’s. At 16 May 2008
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The message in the CPRs? Much the same as the message in the other 
indicators discussed above: SSA still doesn’t measure up well against 
international standards that matter to investors, but it has improved a 
lot. And in conjunction with other, external drivers of investment, this 
improvement is attracting signifi cant amounts of capital to the mineral 
and petroleum sector.
Lower barriers to foreign investment
Last but not least, the subcontinent’s greater openness to foreign 
investment needs mention. In 1990 most African countries restricted 
or banned investment by foreign resource companies. But by 1997 
almost all had developed new mining codes to encourage exploration 
and development.
Moreover, they were liberalising their foreign investment policies 
just as other resource-rich countries — for instance, Venezuela, Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Mongolia — were adopting confrontational forms of resource 
nationalism, sometimes even nationalisation. It is true that some SSA 
countries are seeking to gain a greater share of the windfall revenues 
from the international commodity boom. But by and large the tenor of 
their approach is to get a fair deal, not to nationalise or impose a very 
large state ownership stake without paying a market price for it. This 
goes to make them all the more inviting in the worldwide competition 
for exploration and development dollars.
Better African fundamentals critical
There have been many commodity booms since SSA countries achieved 
independence from the colonial powers in the 1950s and 1960s. Yet none 
served to increase resource investment or production. To the contrary, 
the subcontinent’s share of world mining and petroleum production 
fell over the entire period to 2000. The investment climate was just too 
inhospitable to prompt any appreciable supply response. During the 
current boom, however, investment has been soaring, which holds out 
the promise that SSA will at long last start to increase its share of world 
resource production. This is only possible because the investment climate 
has improved and foreign investment barriers have come down.
Table 1.4: Country performance ratings: Sub-Saharan Africa plus 
comparators
Country CPR Country CPR
Cape Verde 4.56 Papua New Guinea 2.37
Ghana 4.52 São Tomé & Principe 2.35
Tanzania 4.36 Nigeria 2.35
India 4.07 Djibouti 2.32
Senegal 3.79 Gambia 2.31
Vietnam 3.78 Sierra Leone 2.24
Maldives 3.68 Laos 2.14
Mali 3.65 Cambodia 2.12
Uganda 3.58 Burundi 2.10
Burkina Faso 3.55 Congo (Rep) 1.97
Rwanda 3.55 Guinea 1.89
Sri Lanka 3.54 Solomon Islands 1.88
Madagascar 3.41 Guinea-Bissau 1.78
Lesotho 3.38 Eritrea 1.76
Kenya 3.37 Angola 1.54
Benin 3.27 Chad 1.53
Indonesia 3.18 DRC 1.48
Malawi 3.17 Ivory Coast 1.48
Ethiopia 3.12 Sudan 1.35
Zambia 2.90 Comoros 1.34
Mozambique 2.85 Togo 1.24
Niger 2.83 Central African Republic 1.20
Cameroon 2.6 Zimbabwe 0.71
Mauritania 2.51
Source: World Bank.
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‘Stronger for longer’ commodity prices
One important external driver of the investment boom has been 
surging international commodity prices. Between the start of 2002 and 
end-April 2008
• non-fuel commodities in the broad rose 134% in US dollar terms
• metals 269%
• fuels 437% (more than seven-fold since the start of 1999).
See Figures 1.4-1.6.
Two factors seem to account for the price rises — brisk demand and low 
interest rates. The fi rst gets more attention, but the second also matters.
Demand has been growing briskly, because the period since 2002 has 
seen the world economy grow at its fastest since the 1960s. In addition, 
the growth is becoming increasingly concentrated in ‘Chindia’ and other 
developing countries, where the commodity intensity of GDP is high and 
growing, thanks to urbanisation, industrialisation and expanding per 
capita income. For instance, 2007 was the fi rst year in which the so-called 
Apr80 Apr82 Apr84 Apr86 Apr88 Apr90 Apr92 Apr94 Apr96 Apr98 Apr00 Apr02 Apr04 Apr08Apr06
Figure 1.4
Commodity non-fuel price index
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Source: IMF Commodity Statistics.
Index, 2005=100 Apr08Apr80 Apr82 Apr84 Apr86 Apr88 Apr90 Apr92 Apr94 Apr96 Apr98 Apr00 Apr02 Apr04 Apr06
Source: IMF Commodity Statistics. 
Note: includes copper, aluminium, iron ore, tin, nickel, zinc, lead and uranium.
Figure 1.5
Metals price Index
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
Index, 2005=100
Figure 1.6
Fuel and crude oil price index
Apr 92 Apr 94 Apr 96 Apr 98 Apr 00 Apr 02 Apr 04 Apr 06 Apr 08
Source: IMF Commodity Statistics.
Index, 2005=100
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
Commodity fuel (energy)
Crude oil (petroleum)
INTO AFRICA
16 17
DRIVERS OF THE BOOM
average levels for as long as demand remains above where 
it would have been on the basis of trend growth. That is not 
to say that there will not be volatility suffi cient to produce 
temporary falls in commodity prices. And nor does it 
imply that commodity prices will stay up at present levels: 
we should expect prices to fall somewhat as new supply 
capacity is brought on stream. But, absent a substantial 
and sustained negative shock to global demand, we should 
not expect to see average commodity prices fall all the way 
back to turn of the century levels.17
To sum up: prices will probably soften, but not revert to their historic 
trend, or to turn-of-century levels. It is this fi rm outlook, not just current 
strong prices, that is persuading companies to commit capital to projects 
with long gestation and payback periods on the subcontinent.
Global savings glut
Strong international commodity prices have been one international 
market force driving investment into the African resource sector; but 
there is another important one as well — an ample supply of savings 
compared with investment. This is another extraordinary feature of the 
current world economy beyond the turbocharged growth of emerging 
economies and strong commodity prices.
Relative to previous decades, desired saving during this one has been 
high, and desired investment low. Among the reasons have been:
• Fiscal discipline across a broad span of countries
• A 10 percentage point increase in China’s national savings rate 
over the past decade, refl ecting across-the-board increases in 
government, enterprise and household saving18
• Oil producers saving much of the big income windfalls they have 
gained from price rises
BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) contributed more than 50% 
to world economic growth (in purchasing power parity terms); it was 
also the year in which China became the world’s No. 1 growth engine, 
contributing 34% to world growth.14 Thanks to their rapid growth, 
developing countries now account for almost 50% of worldwide demand 
for metals.15 And this number will almost certainly go up even more. 
One statistic to ponder is this.
Today, metals consumption per head in developing 
countries — whose population in aggregate is more than 
fi ve times as large as the total of the developed countries 
— is often one quarter or less that of the rich countries.16
The implication is plain: as poor, but populous economies race to 
catch up to rich country levels of per capita income and materials 
consumption, they will continue to expand their demand for minerals 
and energy rapidly.
What role have low interest rates played in rallying prices? For 
reasons that will be explained in the next section, real — infl ation-
adjusted — rates are down to levels again not seen since the 1960s. 
Low interest rates boost commodity demand by making it cheaper to 
carry inventory. They also curtail supply, by giving miners an incentive, 
at the margin, to leave resources in the ground rather than dig them up, 
as revenue generated today cannot be put to work to earn high interest. 
So all else equal, lower interest rates mean higher demand and lower 
supply than otherwise, and therefore higher prices.
Will the high prices last? The consensus outlook is for only a modest 
decline into the medium term. This forecast is based on the view that 
Chindia will make a sustained difference to global commodity demand — 
plus new supply will come onto the market only gradually and at increasing 
cost. As the Australian Treasury Secretary Ken Henry has noted: 
Provided resources production is not subject to long-run 
increasing returns to scale (declining long-run average 
costs of production), prices should remain above historical 
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• NLNGPlus stage of the Nigeria LNG project, 2002. At the 
time, this was the largest capital project ever to be undertaken 
in Africa. Project sponsors raised around US$1 billion in non-
recourse fi nancing using ECA backing and the cash fl ow of 
previous LNG trains as security. 
Global credit squeeze impact moderate
Will the global credit squeeze that surfaced last August, and associated 
pullback from risk-taking in fi nancial markets, curtail the supply of 
capital to the SSA resource sector, bringing the boom to an end?
The cost of both debt and equity capital has certainly gone up for SSA 
resource projects, and the availability down. But there doesn’t seem to 
be any wholesale fl ight from risk-taking on the subcontinent. 
The overall tightening of credit is so far more of a ‘squeeze’ than a 
‘crunch’. The mark-to-market losses on mortgage-backed securities that 
prompted the squeeze are so far around US$193 billion among major 
international banks, according to the IMF.22 (An alternative tally by 
Bank of America comes to US$300 billion.23) In addition, the banks have 
had to wear a higher cost of funding as risk has been re-priced upwards. 
The losses plus higher funding costs have made the banks less willing 
and able to extend risky credit. This doesn’t mean, however, that they 
are calling in loans and shrinking their balance sheets. They have gone 
out and raised additional capital of US$105 billion (of which US$41 
billion has come from sovereign wealth funds in the Gulf, Singapore 
and China).24 (The corresponding number from Bank of America for 
total capital raised is US$260 billion.) And they are still expanding 
credit, if at a slower pace than before, and at higher interest rates. 
Moreover, they aren’t curtailing their lending uniformly. Mining 
and petroleum loans have been relatively unaffected. This lending is 
remote from, and not susceptible to, the problems besetting mortgage-
backed securities. For one thing, it is generally kept ‘on-balance sheet’, 
rather than securitised and sold on. And therefore its risk hasn’t been 
sliced and diced into the incomprehensible packets that the US sub-
prime mortgages were. Resource fi nanciers also didn’t show the same 
degree of recklessness as did the sub-prime mortgage originators. 
• Cuts to worldwide private investment following the excesses of 
the 1990s’ dot com boom
• Cuts to East Asian private and public investment in the wake of 
the excesses uncovered by the 1997-98 fi nancial crisis.19
The net result has been a situation of large volumes of investable funds 
chasing comparatively few assets. In the process, returns on safe assets 
have been driven to rock-bottom levels. And with the returns on offer 
for safe assets so low, investors have gone on a ‘hunt for yield’ among 
riskier assets (‘up the risk curve’), which has pushed risk premiums 
down ‘along the curve’, and enabled risky projects to clinch fi nancing 
that would otherwise have gone begging — including in the SSA mining 
and petroleum sectors. Examples include
• Lumwana copper mine, Zambia, 2006. A syndicate of 
international fi nanciers backed by offi cial export credit agencies 
(ECAs) is lending US$584 million to this project, set to 
become Africa’s largest open pit copper mine. The Australian- 
and Canadian-listed mining company, Equinox Minerals, 
is developing the mine. Australian companies Ausenco and 
Bateman Engineering have been awarded a US$400 million-plus 
engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contract for 
the project.20
• Chinguetti oilfi eld, Mauritania, 2005. ANZ Investment Bank 
arranged a US$100 million seven-year reserve-based fi nancing for 
Hardman Resources, an independent Australian oil exploration 
fi rm, to fund its share of the US$500 million development cost 
of the offshore Chinguetti fi eld. It used a reserve-based lending 
structure, in which funding is determined by the producer’s 
proven reserves and the cash fl ow that those reserves are 
projected to earn, rather than existing sales. The transaction was 
Mauritania’s fi rst internationally syndicated fi nancing.21
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All in all, says one banker, ‘This is still regarded as a very strong sector 
… There are still a lot of opportunities to be seized’.26
Might such optimism be premature? After all, new losses and funding 
problems are being announced daily and the full extent of the securitised 
lending problem is yet to be fully revealed. Obviously, if the losses snowball 
enough, credit could be severely curtailed. This would act as a severe drag 
or brake on many sectors worldwide, not just the SSA resource sector. 
But the world fi nancial system is still a long way from such a crunch 
point. In April the IMF warned that potential credit losses at fi nancial 
service fi rms worldwide could mount to US$945 billion,27 lowering the 
aggregate capital adequacy ratio of American banks by 2½ percentage 
points and that of European banks by 1½ percentage points. In that 
event, the Fund guesstimated that banks could curtail credit growth 
to a little over 4% a year, compared with the nearly 9% sustained 
on average in the United States in the post-war period.28 This would 
represent quite a severe squeeze, but still not a crunch.
Besides, just as there are factors that could tighten the squeeze, there 
are also factors likely to ease it over time. Among these are offi cial interest 
rate cuts and liquidity provision by central banks and the prospect of 
writebacks on some mortgage-backed securities that were excessively 
written down in the initial hysteria over sub-prime mortgage defaults.
One long run structural factor likely to sustain capital fl ows into the 
SSA resource sector is the large and continuing fl ow of surplus savings 
from economies in the Gulf and East Asia onto world capital markets, 
often channelled by ECAs and sovereign wealth funds. ECAs like China’s 
Eximbank and Sinosure are already lending large sums to SSA resource 
projects and preparing to lend even more (a subject discussed in more detail 
later in this chapter). And attracted by the prospect of high yield and portfolio 
diversifi cation, sovereign wealth funds are likely to follow.
Might the supply of equity capital dry up to a greater extent than the 
debt supply? Again, this doesn’t look likely at this stage. World share 
markets fell almost 30% on average from their peak in the fourth quarter 
of last year to their low in January, as investors sought to withdraw 
capital (although the markets have since retraced about half that fall). 
There have also been in recent months reports of sharemarket listings 
Project fi nancing tends to be a more disciplined practice, involving 
careful risk assessment.
True, banks are now showing a higher degree of risk aversion, 
according to bankers working in the area. They are unwilling to commit 
as much to syndicated loans as before. In fact, they are moving away from 
syndicated lending — where an arranging bank pre-commits to lending 
a certain sum, and only afterwards seeks to sell down its commitment 
to other banks. Instead, they now do 'club lending' — where each bank 
delays its commitment till a syndicate has been formed. And they are 
demanding higher risk margins. Nevertheless, they do continue to 
refi nance maturing debt facilities that are performing and to extend 
fi nance to profi table new projects. 
As recently as May, project sponsors were reporting commercial bank 
interest in taking part in club lending packages for projects even in risky 
countries such as Guinea and the DRC. Private political risk insurers also 
report reasonable capacity — including a preparedness in some cases to 
take on risk of 10 years and longer in amounts exceeding US$50 million 
a project. Funding gaps have certainly opened up in some projects, 
especially the larger ones, but multilateral bodies such as the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the European Investment 
Bank plus ECAs are willing and able to fi ll many of these gaps.25 
Other strategies that companies are reportedly using to fi nance 
projects are:
• getting offtake parties such as smelters to extend mezzanine fi nance
• altering mine plans and development schedules to fi t in with the 
now-reduced volume of fi nance available
• drawing upon cash raised while the debt and equity markets 
were still bullish
• engaging in mergers and acquisitions to get hold of strong cash 
fl ows and cash hoards in other companies.
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the high cost of doing business at home. Malaysian state-owned energy 
company Petronas and some Russian resource companies wish to 
internationalise their operations as their domestic reserves diminish. 
In addition, the US, through a variety of diplomatic, aid and military 
initiatives, is attempting to bring political and economic stability to the 
subcontinent broadly, and in particular to the Gulf of Guinea, with a 
view to developing an alternative source of oil to the Gulf. A similar 
stabilising infl uence is provided by France through its military presence 
in Francophone Africa.
These initiatives are together giving added impetus to the 
investment boom. 
China 
Beijing has long had a strategic interest in SSA. Back in the Maoist days, 
this interest was overwhelmingly ideological — to export revolution. 
Later the Chinese government began to engage Taiwan in diplomatic 
competition on the subcontinent. In the mid-1990s, it instigated a hunt 
for natural resources to sustain China’s rapid economic growth. In line 
with this latest switch, it has been making major commitments of aid 
and investment to Africa, especially to petroleum- and mineral-rich 
states such as Angola, Nigeria, the DRC and Sudan. 
Among the largest of its aid recipients so far have been Angola, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. Overall, the World Bank estimates that 
China has lent Angola US$9.8 billion; the Angolan Finance Ministry 
said in October 2007 that its credit from the China International Fund 
alone was US$2.9 billion.32
One of the fi rst big resource projects that China undertook was 
an investment in Sudan’s oil industry. In 1996, the China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) bought a 40% stake in the Greater Nile 
Petroleum Corporation. CNPC transformed Greater Nile into Sudan’s 
leading exporter — with China its No. 1 customer.
Beijing is now providing fi nancial backing for hundreds of Chinese 
companies exporting to and investing in Africa — companies such as 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation, CNPC and Sinopec (petroleum), 
Jiangsu International (construction), and Huawei (telecoms).
being cancelled and new equity raisings declining. Because exploration 
companies rely almost exclusively on equity capital, this withdrawal and 
withholding of capital could be a serious problem. Even for development 
projects, debt won’t be forthcoming if equity isn’t. Still, the anecdotal 
evidence suggests again that profi table companies and projects are still 
fi nding it possible to tap the equity markets, with more equity raisings 
being reported than cancellations.29
To sum up: some resource projects will be delayed, and burdened 
with higher debt servicing costs, and some marginal projects will be 
cancelled, due to the global credit squeeze and associated increase 
in risk aversion. But the crisis hasn’t caused any wholesale funding 
withdrawal, and nor is such a withdrawal likely in future. Sound 
projects catering to the burgeoning international demand for resources 
are likely to continue getting funding.
New Great Game 
So far this chapter has discussed one domestic driver of the African 
resources boom — improved African ‘fundamentals’. It has also 
discussed two external economic drivers — high commodity prices 
and a global savings glut. But there is a fi nal factor, and it is more a 
geopolitical one. It has been called the ‘New Great Game’.30 Why New 
Great Game? Because it resembles the so-called Great Game played in 
the 19th century by Britain and Russia as they competed for infl uence 
in the Middle East and Central Asia.
Countries such as China, India, the Gulf sheikhdoms, Korea, Brazil, 
Malaysia, Russia, and to a lesser extent, Japan are now making state-
supported investments in the African resource sector through both 
state and private companies. For China, India, Korea and Japan this is 
mainly an effort to secure raw materials and energy for their factories, 
utilities and infrastructure projects — a so-called quest for ‘equity oil’ 
or ‘customer equity’ as part of a ‘resource security’ strategy.31 For the 
Gulf, too, the motivations include securing raw materials, as well as 
diversifying investment portfolios. For Brazil, Malaysia and Russia, 
other motives are at work. Brazilian companies report a wish to escape 
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Potentially overshadowing all of Beijing’s previous investments 
is an offer it made Nigeria in April 2008: US$40 billion-50 billion of 
export credit guarantees from Sinosure, a sister export credit agency of 
China Eximbank. The money will reportedly help fund projects over 
the next three years. Investments mentioned include railways, power 
stations, oil refi neries and petrochemical plants. In return, China could 
reportedly gain access to oil blocks. Even if the deal isn’t realised on the 
scale and in the timeframe announced, it could still represent China’s 
biggest foray into Africa.35
A point this paper makes later on is that the Chinese push into Africa 
hasn’t always been smooth: there have been fi ts and starts. State-owned 
companies have competed against one another; they have ignored Beijing’s 
instructions; and as latecomers to the subcontinent, they have often had to 
make do with poor concessions that earlier western investors rejected.
Nevertheless, the jumbo loans and gurantees to the DRC and Nigeria seem 
to mark a quantitative and qualitative leap forward in China’s ambitions. In 
essence, they represent an attempt to vertically integrate China’s resource-
hungry factories with DRC mines and Nigerian oil and gas fi elds in a kind 
of M&A operation between China Inc and Africa Ltd. If they succeed, they 
will catapult China into the No. 1 place among foreign resource investors in 
SSA.
Thanks to China’s roaring demand for African commodities combined 
with its generous supply of credit and investment, Sino-African two-
way trade has soared — from US$4 billion in 1996 to more than US$50 
billion by 2006. And if Chinese President Hu Jintao is to be believed the 
trade could double to US$100 billion over 2006-09.36 
India
Indian business links with SSA are deep and go back a long way. There 
are large Indian communities in eastern and southern Africa that 
descend from indentured Indian workers brought to Africa by British 
colonial governments in the 19th century. These communities have 
traditionally been active in wholesale and retail trade and in small to 
mid-sized manufacturing, especially textiles. More recently, Indian 
multinationals such as ArcelorMittal, Tata and Vedanta, as well as 
A key organisation backing Chinese resource investment is China 
Eximbank, the world’s third-largest ECA. It has reportedly provided 
US$15 billion over the last few years to both Chinese suppliers to 
Africa and their African buyers. Many of its loans seem to be backed 
by mineral or petroleum exports. All are reportedly ‘soft’ ones with 
concessional terms. For ‘state-encouraged key overseas investment 
projects’, including natural resource projects, China Eximbank provides 
an interest rate discount of at least two percentage points.33 
 Not only does China Eximbank provide soft loans to resource 
projects directly; it also supports ‘oil-for-infrastructure’ deals and 
‘commodity-for-infrastructure’ deals more broadly. Until recently, the 
most prominent example was a US$2 billion low-interest loan to Angola 
in 2004. This is fi nancing refurbishment by Chinese companies of the 
Benguela railway. During the days of Portuguese rule this line hauled 
ore from the mines of Zambia and the then-Zaire, but it was sabotaged 
during the 1975-2002 civil war, and fell into disuse. 
In November 2006, the Chinese government hosted more than 35 
African heads of state for the China-Africa Forum, and in May 2007 
hosted the annual meeting of the African Development Bank. At the 
2007 meeting, the Chinese government said it would extend a US$20 
billion package of trade and infrastructure loans to Africa over the 
following three years. 
The fi rst installment of that package was made in October 2007 — a 
US$5 billion concessional loan to the DRC. US$3 billion of that loan is 
reportedly earmarked to upgrade road and rail links between the DRC’s 
mines and ports inside and outside the country. A further US$2 billion 
is to rehabilitate existing mining infrastructure and establish Sino-
Congolese mining joint ventures. 
In April 2008 the DRC government announced that the loan package 
would be lifted to US$9¼ billion. The DRC would pledge copper and 
cobalt to China in return for roads, railways and other infrastructure — 
which now reportedly includes hundreds of clinics, hospitals and schools 
plus two hydroelectric dams. Likening the loans to the Marshall Plan that 
helped reconstruct Europe after World War II, DRC President Joseph 
Kabila said that they would help integrate and unify his country.34
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• the Indian Oil & Natural Gas Company (ONGC) investing in 
Sudan, Nigeria and Madagascar
• ONGC teaming up in 1996 with Mittal Investment Sarl, the 
investment holding arm of Mittal, to make a US$6 billion bid to 
acquire oil leases and develop infrastructure in Nigeria.
In the background, Delhi is complementing the investment push by its 
private and state companies with a variety of aid and credit initiatives. 
• The Export-Import Bank of India reported in 2006 that it had 
extended 33 lines of credit with a total value of US$1 billion to 
banks in 34 African countries.38
• At an India-Africa Summit in April 2008 Delhi announced a 
US$500 million aid package and duty-free access to India for 34 
African states.
• The government has used the IMF HIPC Initiative to write off 
outstanding loans to Africa.
• It has pledged new lines of credit worth US$500 million each to two 
other initiatives — the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) and Team 9. NEPAD is an ‘African-owned peer review 
process’ under which national governments submit their governance 
to review by fellow African countries. Team 9 is an initiative between 
India and a group of nine Francophone African countries.39
Like China, India has experienced mixed results from ‘resource 
diplomacy’ and ‘strategic competition’. Chinese companies have 
reportedly out-competed their Indian counterparts for several energy 
concessions. For instance, a bid by ONGC in 2004 to gain access to 
Angolan energy resources was thwarted when Beijing offered a US$2 
billion loan to Luanda. ONGC has also lost out to competition from its 
smaller pharmaceutical and IT companies, have also been investing.
After a long downhill slide, government-to-government relations are 
improving. In the 1950s and 1960s, Indian Prime Minister Jawarlahal 
Nehru supported African independence struggles, especially in Kenya. 
The Indian government also collaborated with African countries in 
the Non-Aligned Movement, set up to challenge the US and the Soviet 
Union. But relations deteriorated in the 1970s, after Kenya and Uganda 
sought to expel their Indian communities and West African countries 
raised trade barriers against Indian textile exports.37
‘Trade’ and ‘the fl ag’ followed each other downwards so that by 1991 
Indo-African trade was worth less than US$1 billion a year. But since 
then, commerce and diplomacy have begun to recover — in 2007 the 
two-way trade alone had climbed back to US$25 billion.
The renewed diplomatic effort by Delhi comes partly from fear of 
losing infl uence, particularly to China. But it is also motivated by a 
quest for energy and resource security — Delhi wants to see Indian 
oil imports decrease from their current level of 70% of national oil 
consumption, for instance; and if it can’t extract more oil at home, then 
it at least wants to produce ‘equity oil’ abroad. Refl ecting these two 
priorities, Delhi is earmarking most of its African aid to the Indian 
Ocean region, where its defence and security interests lie; and to 
resource-rich countries such as Nigeria, Sudan, Guinea, Angola (and in 
North Africa, Algeria) where it is increasingly ‘trading’ aid for resource 
concessions.
The private sector has led the Indian business push into Africa, 
particularly into the non-resource sector. Even in the resource sector 
there are some large private Indian investments. Most prominent is 
the plan by ArcelorMittal, the world’s largest steel maker, to create an 
iron ore supply hub in West Africa to feed its steel mills in Europe. It 
has plans to mine 12 million tonnes of ore a year in Mauritania; to 
invest US$2.2 billion in a mine in Senegal; and to raise its investment to 
US$1½ billion from US$1 billion in Liberia. Another large investment 
is a Vedanta Resources copper mine in Zambia. 
In the resource sector, Indian state and joint state/private initiatives 
are also important. Instances of such investments are:
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Korea
As a major industrial economy almost wholly dependent on imports of 
energy and raw materials, Korea has recently become acutely aware of 
its vulnerability to international price and supply shocks. In the hope of 
reducing this vulnerability, Seoul has started to encourage private and 
state-owned fi rms to form consortiums and partnerships to invest in 
overseas energy and mineral projects.
The risk appetite of ‘Korea Inc’ appears to be large. Korean companies 
don’t overlook the chance to invest in low-risk jurisdictions. The 
country’s largest foreign coal investment so far, for instance, is the 
purchase earlier this year of a 10% interest in the Moolarben mine 
in New South Wales: this will enable the giant state power company 
KEPCO to buy coal at cost. But nor do Korean companies pass up the 
chance to venture further afi eld. A Korean consortium is developing 
four oil fi elds in Iraq’s Kurdistan region at a cost of US$10 billion. State-
run Korea Gas Corporation has signed a US$1.8 billion gas-chemical 
joint-venture agreement in Uzbekistan. In 2007, South Korean fi rms 
invested US$2½ billion in foreign energy projects, up 79% on 2006. 
And that fi gure could well double again this year.41
The search for offshore resources has a strong African element. On a 
visit to Africa in 2006, President Roh Moo-hyun said Korea would triple aid 
to the continent by 2008. Roh held meetings with heads of state from Benin, 
Ghana, the Republic of Congo, Nigeria and Tanzania. His successor, Lee 
Myung-bak, plans to strengthen those efforts, and has set a goal of raising 
Korea’s ‘self-suffi ciency ratios’ for six key materials, including uranium.
At the project level, a consortium led by state-run Korean National 
Oil Corporation (KNOC) won the right in 2006 to develop oilfi elds in 
Nigerian waters in the Gulf of Guinea, against competition from India’s 
ONGC. As part of the deal, the consortium agreed to invest heavily in 
energy facilities, including power stations. KNOC is also buying 11% of 
M’Boundi, an onshore Republic of Congo oilfi eld, for US$435 million. 
Brazil 
In recent years, Brazil has become a signifi cant emerging market FDI 
source, so much so that in 2006 its outward FDI, of US$28 billion, 
Korean counterpart (see section below).
As a latecomer to the New Great Game, India lags well behind China, 
but its resource diplomacy is now adding signifi cantly to the commercial 
efforts of India’s private resource companies.
Gulf
The Gulf has always had strong commercial ties with North Africa, 
but in recent times it has also been establishing links with SSA. The 
chief reason is a need to fi nd investment outlets for its massive surplus 
savings — savings that have soared to around US$250 billion a year 
thanks to the oil boom. It has found that many African investments 
are meeting its selection criteria — they boost risk-adjusted returns 
by diversifying away from traditional investment destinations like 
the US and by tapping fast-growing markets. In addition, they allow 
Gulf fi rms to put to work their expertise in areas such as petroleum 
engineering and to supply raw materials to the Gulf’s fl ourishing 
heavy industry (aluminium, steel, building materials, etc). 
Between 2002 and 2006, Gulf governments and private sector fi rms 
invested an estimated US$22 billion outside the United States, Europe 
and Asia (of a total estimated investment of US$542 billion). Africa is 
likely to have received a considerable share of these investments. The 
signifi cance of these sums can be seen when they are compared with 
total foreign direct investment (FDI) into SSA of only US$12 billion in 
2006, according to UNCTAD.40
In the energy sector, the investments have included purchase of 
Ghanaian power plants by Abu Dhabi’s TAQA and purchase of West 
African offshore assets by UAE-based Dana Gas through its newly 
acquired Centurion Energy subsidiary.
 In the mining sector, Qatar Steel is investing US$375 million in a 
Mauritanian iron ore project initiated by Australia’s Sphere Investments 
in order to supply Gulf and other steel producers with ore from 2010. An 
Abu Dhabi sovereign wealth fund, Mubadala, and the Dubai government’s 
Dubai Aluminium (Dubal) are investing in the US$4.8 billion Sangarédi 
bauxite mine and alumina refi nery in Guinea. This is a joint venture with 
BHP Billiton and the Canadian-listed but US-controlled Global Alumina.
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The Malaysian government has frequently used Petronas since its 
establishment in 1974 as an instrument of industry policy, and as a 
result Petronas is accustomed to subordinating commercial objectives 
to political ones. For instance, it was used to bail out the troubled 
Bank Bumiputra during the 1997-98 Asian fi nancial crisis and to build 
Malaysia’s new administrative capital, Putrajaya. During the 1997-98 
crisis and a 1980s debt crisis it increased oil production to support 
the government’s fi nancial position.46 The company has strong state 
backing for its push overseas, including into Africa.
Russia
Both the Kremlin and Russian state and private companies have 
striven in recent years to improve business ties with Africa, which 
since the fall of the Iron Curtain have dwindled rapidly. On the 
political side, the government has written off more than US$14 
billion of African debt and given trade preferences to 50 African 
states. On the commercial side, companies are making a variety of 
investments. The industries include gold, aluminium, diamonds, 
oil and mining engineering; the countries: South Africa, Guinea, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, the DRC and Angola. 
The majority state-owned Gazprom — the world’s largest gas 
company — is in talks with the governments of Nigeria and Equatorial 
Guinea (as well as Algeria, Egypt and Libya) over investments in their 
gas industries.47 With Lagos, the discussions reportedly centre on 
a US$1billion-2½ billion investment — a move the Financial Times 
believes will ‘send shivers through western governments already 
concerned about a shortage of global gas supplies’.48 
In the banking arena, state-owned Vneshtorgbank has opened a 
variety of offi ces and joint ventures to support Russian resource and 
industrial companies in Africa.
Japan
Japan began to practice resource diplomacy in Africa after the 1970s 
oil shocks. Those shocks exposed its vulnerability to shortages of oil 
and other strategic minerals. In a bid to secure supplies, it opened 
exceeded inward FDI of US$27 billion. Most of Brazil’s FDI targets 
developed economies — the proportion was 75% in 2005.42 Even so, 
Brazilian fi rms are keen to compete for African mining and petroleum 
deposits and the infrastructure projects being spawned by the resource 
boom, especially in Lusophone Africa. 
Brazil’s No. 1 multinational, the state-owned oil company Petrobras, 
has plans to invest more than US$112 billion over 2008-12, 13% abroad, 
with West Africa one of its target areas. Meanwhile, Vale (previously 
named CVRD), the world’s second-largest mining company by market 
capitalisation, has said it will invest US$59 billion abroad over the next 
fi ve years; it has already started to sink US$2 billion into a coal mine 
and power station in Mozambique.
In contrast with the past when Brazilian governments were often 
hostile to outward FDI, the current government is backing its companies 
with funding through the National Development Bank, BNDES. The 
Angolan oil and infrastructure boom is one focus: President Luiz Inacio Lula 
da Silva said in October 2007 that his government would boost its existing 
US$1.3 billion line of credit to Angola by US$1 billion to help Brazilian 
companies win contracts in the petroleum and infrastructure sectors.43 
Malaysia 
Malaysian state oil company Petronas — the world’s largest emerging 
market transnational company by international assets44 and the owner 
of the world’s largest LNG tanker fl eet — is actively seeking to diversify 
its operations overseas in the face of dwindling domestic oil reserves 
estimated to last less than 15 years at current production levels.
It has operations in 33 countries. In Africa it is in: Benin, Cameroon, 
Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Mozambique, South 
Africa and Sudan. Its largest African investment is its Engen subsidiary, 
which controls a refi nery in South Africa and more than 1300 petrol 
stations across Africa. It also has a stake in the controversial Chad-
Cameroon oil pipeline. Among its upstream production interests 
are a 30% stake in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company, 
which produces 90% of Sudan’s oil output, and a stake in an oilfi eld 
in Chad.45
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the IOCs.’ Besides, while the NOCs ‘have deep pockets, they lack the 
technologies necessary to compete for some of Africa’s most desirable 
blocks, like those located in the deep waters of the Gulf of Guinea.’
What’s more, the NOCs aren’t pawns in a highly-coordinated 
‘China Inc’ game being played by Beijing. Actually, liberalisation and 
decentralisation of China’s energy sector has resulted in a low level 
of coordination between Beijing and the NOCs. The NOCs often 
wield more power and infl uence than their supposed masters in the 
bureaucracy. They often treat one another as rivals, lowering the rate 
of return for the winner of a concession. And they pay scant regard to 
Beijing’s wider political and diplomatic strategies.
Finally, the NOCs don’t compete that unfairly with Western oil 
companies for acreage in Africa. They do receive state fi nancial 
support, but they suffer from offsetting handicaps — chiefl y because 
they are latecomers to the international oil business. In addition, oil-
for-infrastructure deals have not won China’s NOCs many attractive 
assets. Noteworthy in this regard is Nigeria where an agreement by 
Beijing to invest US$2 billion in an oil refi nery in exchange for the right 
of fi rst refusal on four oil blocks came to nothing — the blocks showed 
little promise.
Another sceptic is Mikkal Herberg of the National Bureau of Asian 
Research,51 who observes that Asian NOCs ‘are behaving autonomously 
and investing in the same manner as commercially driven IOCs’. They 
‘do not currently present a major competitive threat to the IOCs, who 
[sic] remain at the top of the industry’s ‘food chain’ because of their 
technological and managerial expertise’.
In other words, both scholars make the case that state-owned and 
-directed companies often show profi t-motivated and competitive 
behavior and are quite autonomous from their political masters. 
Still, they themselves acknowledge that these companies are also 
susceptible to government direction and non-commercial motives. 
Downs notes: ‘Beijing has certainly encouraged China’s NOCs to 
expand internationally, provided them with varying levels of diplomatic 
and fi nancial support, and occasionally intervened in the companies’ 
foreign investment decision-making’.52 
its aid cheque-book in resource-rich states like Nigeria, at one stage 
becoming Africa’s largest donor. The preeminence didn’t last long, 
however. In 1990 the Japanese asset price bubble burst loudly. Among 
the knock-on effects were a stagnating economy, shrinking aid budget 
and dwindling infl uence in Africa. Japanese companies began to fi nd 
themselves out-muscled by China and other countries in the scramble 
for resources.
Tokyo now reportedly wants to strengthen its presence again. Before 
the Tokyo International Conference on African Development in May 
2008, attended by 45 African countries, Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda 
announced Japan would double its annual aid to Africa to US$1.8 billion 
by 2012; open embassies in Botswana, Mali and Malawi; and relax its 
ban on lending to nations that have benefi ted from debt relief. While 
these initiatives are still an order of magnitude less than what Beijing 
appears to be doing, the government is reportedly hopeful that they will 
help Japanese companies win a larger share of infrastructure contracts. 
According to the director general for African affairs in the foreign 
ministry, the government is also considering ways of ‘limiting private 
sector risk’ for Japanese investors. In making this point he noted the 
success of Mitsubishi’s aluminium smelting business in Mozambique, a 
joint venture with BHP Billiton.49
How signifi cant is state-directed investment?
Despite the ostensibly big intrusion of the state into African resource 
investment, scholars disagree about how much this has prompted 
uncommercial investment — and correspondingly ‘tilted the playing 
fi eld’ against resource companies from more market-oriented economies 
also vying for resource concessions. 
We take the view that these phenomena are signifi cant ones now, and 
could grow in importance. Nevertheless, there are sceptics. One is Erica 
Downs of the Brookings Institution50, who argues that Chinese national 
oil companies (NOCs) aren’t ‘locking out’ Western oil companies from 
Africa. They dominate only Sudan’s oil industry. Most of their African 
assets ‘are of a size and quality of little interest to international oil 
companies (IOCs). In fact, many of these assets were relinquished by 
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US
Like the other governments whose Africa policies are discussed above, 
Washington seems to have ‘woken up’ to Africa only recently. During 
the 2000 presidential campaign, George Bush stated that Africa was 
of no strategic signifi cance to the US.59 After he took offi ce in 2001, 
however, the Administration quickly realised that energy security 
and counter-terrorism were going to be key priorities, and that Africa 
matters a lot for both. Accordingly, it has moved to nearly triple African 
aid, extend signifi cant debt relief, support UN peace-keeping missions, 
sponsor meetings among Gulf of Guinea states to develop regional 
plans to protect their petroleum industries, and give responsibility 
for US military involvement in Africa to a separate Africa Command 
('AFRICOM') to be eventually based on the continent.
According to one estimate, the US government will invest more than 
$10 billion a year in the Gulf of Guinea over the next 10 years. It will 
spread this sum across oil activities; oceanic research in the deep-sea 
waters of Equatorial Guinea and Angola; restoration and preservation 
of forests in Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, the Republic of Congo, DRC, 
Cameroon and the Central African Republic; training for African peace-
keeping forces; and ‘discrete political interventions’.60
Importantly, in his 2006 State of the Union Address, the President 
said he intended ‘to replace more than 75% of our oil imports from the 
Middle East by 2025’. The government explicitly sees this replacement 
coming from the Gulf of Guinea: it has stated that if Nigeria and Angola 
keep on track to double oil production over the coming decade, the US 
could increase the proportion of its oil imports coming from Africa to 
25% from its present 15%. It has been calculated that the deepwater 
oilfi elds in the Gulf of Guinea could supply more than a third of the 
increase in world oil production to 2010. 
While only some of the Administration’s policies are directly 
supporting resource investment in Africa, most are doing so indirectly. 
This is happening in two ways.
• Garnering goodwill. Broadly speaking, Africans have welcomed 
Bush Administration initiatives like its proposed US$5 billion 
Besides, pointing out that the NOCs are profi t-oriented is irrelevant, if 
their profi tability is underwritten by credit and other subsidies from the 
government. As Downs admits: ‘Beijing’s fi nancial largesse does provide 
China’s NOCs with a competitive advantage over oil companies that do not 
receive similar support from their governments … Beijing’s deep pockets 
have, for example, helped Sinopec acquire some assets in Angola’.53 
And in the future? There are indications that the New Great Game 
will intensify, even if it isn’t much of an issue now. Concerned that 
Chinese companies had been undermining foreign policy objectives, 
Chinese Vice President Zeng Qinghong urged them in 2005 to coordinate 
their strategies and consult Beijing more.54 Already, Downs notes, 
‘Head-to-head competition between China’s NOCs has diminished in 
recent years … probably due to both the companies’ diverging foreign 
investment strategies and the attempts of the National Development 
and Reform Commission to ensure that only one company pursues any 
invitation extended to multiple Chinese fi rms to negotiate bilaterally for 
a particular asset’.55 Herberg adds: ‘The issue of fair competition may 
arise … due to growing alliances and tied aid between consumer and 
producer NOCs …’56 Finally, as already noted, the amounts of subsidised 
credit being extended by Beijing in commodity-for-infrastructure deals 
seem to be growing in leaps and bounds.
It could well be that in the long run, to again cite Herberg, ‘Asia’s 
NOCs will be pressured — by IOCs, host economies, world oil prices, 
and profi t motives — to shift toward a market-oriented pattern of 
growth and investment’.57 But the operative phrase here is ‘in the 
long run’. The losses incurred in non-commercial investment will 
mount. It may be seen that ‘national pursuit of equity oil supplies 
does not necessarily serve long-term energy security interests’.58 So 
the corporatist and mercantilist policies will be ditched and the profi t 
motive come to prevail.
However, for the time being, it does seem valid to use the term New 
Great Game to denote a phenomenon that is both boosting investment 
in the SSA resource sector and starting to challenge international 
resource companies. 
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French company Total is the largest oil refi ning and product 
distribution company in Africa. And French companies still dominate 
production in the mature oilfi elds of Gabon, the Republic of Congo and 
Cameroon, as well as having smaller interests in Angola and Nigeria. 
But in the new fi elds of Chad, the Ivory Coast and Mauritania, other 
foreign investors are stealing a march.
French mining companies also appear to have been outmanoeuvred in 
the rush for gold, bauxite and other minerals in West Africa. Canadian 
companies appear to be doing particularly well in Francophone Africa 
thanks to their combined linguistic and mining skills. Other prominent 
investors in ‘la Francophonie’ are the United States, Russia and China, 
as well as Australia.62
Although French policies aren’t putting any strong tailwinds 
behind French investment in the SSA resource sector, they are, like 
America’s policies, keeping confl icts in check and promoting political 
stability, which in a roundabout way promotes the development of the 
resource sector. 
The most important stabiliser is military presence. France is the only 
former colonial power with troops permanently garrisoned in Africa. 
It has permanent bases in Djibouti, Gabon and Senegal, as well as 
on the Indian Ocean island of Reunion. Its troops also support three 
other former colonies — Chad, the Ivory Coast and the Central African 
Republic. In addition, the French Navy and Marines have permanent 
deployments off East and West Africa. Finally, French troops and 
police serve with multilateral peace support operations in Chad/Central 
African Republic and on the Ivory Coast. On many occasions, these 
troops have been used to quell insurgencies or combat foreign invasions. 
In April 2008, they were deployed from Djibouti to free hostages taken 
by Somali pirates from a yacht.
While critics of France’s Africa policy have claimed that it perversely 
promotes instability and confl ict by supporting autocratic loyalist 
regimes over democratic contenders, the fact remains that the troop 
presence and other levers that France controls have on many occasions 
headed off or ended armed confl ict.
increase in annual aid through the establishment of a Millennium 
Challenge Account (MCA) and a $15 billion initiative to fi ght AIDS 
named PEPFAR — the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief; 
PEPFAR has given more than one million Africans infected with 
HIV anti-viral treatment. The Administration has also increased 
access for African exports to the US through its African Growth 
and Opportunity Act and a proposed free trade agreement (FTA) 
with the member states of the Southern African Customs Union 
— Namibia, South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland. 
Thanks to initiatives like these, George W Bush has ‘done more (for 
Africa) than any other president so far’, says celebrity anti-poverty 
campaigner Bob Geldof.61 Africans seem to agree. As noted earlier 
in this chapter, opinion polling fi nds a positive view of America in 
nearly all African countries surveyed, even in countries with large 
Muslim populations. Such goodwill erodes support for terrorism 
directed at American interests, and Western interests more broadly. 
All else equal, it is also likely to reduce other political risks facing 
foreign investors, such as sabotage and labour unrest.
• Market and security assurances. The Administration’s 
policies have reduced uncertainty for companies contemplating 
sinking large amounts of capital into often deep-water drilling 
for oil and gas in the Gulf of Guinea. True, the strong outlook 
for oil prices is itself a good reason to invest. But it helps that the 
US has said that it will actively seek to buy Gulf of Guinea oil in 
preference to Middle East supply, and through AFRICOM and 
military/intelligence cooperation with African governments, 
will seek to increase security for the petroleum sector. 
France
During the colonial period and its aftermath, France did take advantage 
of its special relationship with Francophone Africa to gain resource 
concessions there. But in more recent years its dominance of the 
resource sector has come under challenge from both Anglo-Saxon and 
Asian companies.
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Dimensions of  the boom
What are the dimensions of the boom described in the previous chapter. 
The stocks and fl ows of FDI? Into which minerals and countries? From 
which countries?
The data confi rm that an African FDI boom is defi nitely underway, 
if from a low base; that the lion’s share of investment is going to oil 
and gas and therefore North Africa, which has the largest hydrocarbon 
reserves; even so, signifi cant sums are also going into the Gulf of Guinea 
(oil and gas again) and into minerals in SSA more broadly. What’s more, 
the investment ‘pipeline’ suggests that the exploration and development 
upswing still has a way to go.
FDI from developed economies dominates the stock of existing 
petroleum and mining investment in SSA. But that shouldn’t blind 
one to signifi cant recent increases in investment infl ows from China in 
particular, and other emerging markets. As a result, recent investment 
infl ows are now less dominated by developed countries.
‘Boom’ no exaggeration
According to UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2007, FDI infl ows to 
Africa doubled over 2004-06; and in 2006, jumped 20% from the year 
before to an historical high of US$35½ billion. True, around two-thirds of 
How the drivers interact
Investors allocate capital to projects according to their risk-adjusted 
returns. Those with the highest returns get funded fi rst. Companies 
will endeavour to fund all those projects whose risk-adjusted returns 
exceed their cost of capital. Before the four drivers noted above made 
their infl uence felt, most African resource projects were uneconomic 
— their prospective rate of return was less than the cost of capital 
to develop them, including the risk premium investors demanded to 
compensate for the ‘extra excitement’ of sinking dollars into Africa. But 
now prospective rates of return have risen thanks to higher commodity 
prices and improved economic and political stability. Meanwhile, the 
cost of capital, including the premium demanded for political risk, has 
fallen thanks to the global savings glut. Finally, because of the New Great 
Game, some projects are getting funded despite being commercially 
unprofi table. 
So a boom is on. And after decades of neglect and decline, SSA appears 
to be on the path to reclaiming its place as a major world supplier of 
minerals and energy.
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Table 2.1: Africa’s top ten FDI recipients
Amount
($USm)
Share
(% African total)
Egypt 10,043 28
Nigeria 5,445 15
Sudan 3,541 10
Tunisia 3,312 9
Morocco 2,898 8
Algeria 1,795 5
Libya 1,734 5
Equatorial Guinea 1,656 5
Chad 700 2
Ghana 435 1
Africa (% global FDI) 30,672 3.3
Source: UNCTAD (2007a). Data are for 2006.
New projects prominent
FDI infl ows in 2006 were skewed towards new projects rather than 
existing ones. In 2006, 442 new FDI projects were recorded, almost 
on par with the 459 recorded in 2005. (2005 was itself a record year 
– greenfi eld FDI projects jumped by around 60% in that year.) Again, 
there is a heavy weighting towards countries in petroleum-rich North 
Africa, although Nigeria and Angola also secured a signifi cant number 
of new projects. In addition, several projects are in mineral-rich SSA 
countries such as South Africa, Ghana and Zambia.67 
Mining recovers
While oil and gas predominate, the mining sector is also attracting 
increasing investment, especially in exploration. According to the 
Metals Economics Group (MEG), a consultancy tracking non-ferrous 
this has gone to petroleum-rich North African countries. But that has still 
left, depending on the year, around a third to a half for SSA (Figure 2.1). 
Oil and gas predominant
According to UNCTAD63, investment in the extractive sector accounted for 
the majority of Africa’s FDI infl ows in 2006, as it did in previous years. 
Within the extractive sector, most investment went into oil and gas, 
although some was mining-related. Africa’s three leading oil producers 
— Nigeria, Sudan and Algeria — accounted for 30% of infl ows.64 
In contrast, Ghana, an increasingly important mining destination, 
accounted for only around 1% of total infl ows (Table 2.1). 
In its 2006 World Energy Outlook, the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) forecasts that Africa as a whole will account for around 13% 
(roughly US$40 billion) of worldwide investment spending on 
sanctioned and planned oil and gas projects over the period 2006-10.65 
Around two-thirds of this spending will be for development of large 
projects in recently discovered fi elds in Nigeria. Although Angola wasn’t 
a prominent FDI recipient in 2006, the scale of the planned investment 
there suggests this will change over coming years.66
2002 2003 20052004 2006
Figure 2.1
African FDI inflows
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Source: UNCTAD; authors’ calculations.
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The picture painted by MEG and others is reinforced by mining 
company announcements. A 2006 investor presentation by BHP 
Billiton forecast that almost 50% of the company’s worldwide 
minerals exploration budget would be directed towards Africa in the 
2007 fi nancial year, which implies total African spending of well over 
US$205 million based on the company’s total mineral exploration 
spending of US$410 million in the year to 30 June 2007.70
At the 2007 Indaba conference in Cape Town, a leading African mining 
conference, company presentations identifi ed countries of interest and 
sketched out exploration and development plans. Rio Tinto said that 
Africa accounts for around 4% of its operating assets and that the 
company is active in six African countries outside South Africa (versus 
four in 2004).71 Moreover, the company revealed that it is chasing new 
opportunities or assessing entry into a further 14 countries and plans 
to spend at least US$15 million on 'greenfi eld' African exploration in 
2007, targeting copper, iron ore, industrial minerals and diamonds. 
Exploration data for the fi rst half of 2007 suggest that the company 
spent almost twice this amount on African exploration.72 At Indaba 
2008, Rio Tinto reported active exploration programs in 11 countries, 
with a further 10 under consideration.73 
Indaba 2007 presentations from a selection of mid-tier and junior 
companies, including Barrick, Petra Diamonds, Africo and Mano River 
Resources, discussed a broad span of both existing and prospective 
projects in a range of African countries, from South Africa to Sierra 
Leone. In addition to its US$1 billion stake in three current mines in 
Tanzania, Barrick is also pursuing three development projects — in gold, 
nickel and platinum. Africo is developing a high-grade copper-cobalt 
project in the DRC and plans to start mining in 2008 at an estimated 
total capital cost of US$200 million.74 
On a larger scale, India’s Arcelor Mittal has committed to invest 
more than US$3 billion in iron ore projects in Mauritania, Senegal and 
Liberia — probably much more than US$3 billion. The investment will 
go into mines and associated railways and ports.75 
BHP Billiton is also considering big investments in African projects: it 
is a joint venture partner in the proposed US$3 billion Sangarédi alumina 
exploration spending by mining companies, the current mineral 
exploration cycle has seen rising interest in regions with high political 
risk, including Africa and Latin America.68
Worldwide, companies’ non-ferrous mineral exploration budgets 
have grown strongly since the 12-year low reached in 2002, peaking at 
more than US$10½ billion in 2007. Although Africa’s percentage share 
of these budgets has hovered around the mid-teens since 2002, the 
region has received substantial annual increases in budget allocations 
since 2003 (Table 2.2). Some of this increase refl ects higher exploration 
costs, which have been rising faster than broad infl ation. But anecdotal 
evidence suggests that ‘real’ — infl ation-adjusted — activity has also 
increased markedly. 
Table 2.2: African non-ferrous mineral exploration budgets
Share
(% worldwide 
budgets)
Allocation
(Nominal US$, 
millions)
Change on 
previous year 
(%)
2001 14 277 -6
2002 15 257 -7
2003 17 374 46
2004 16 272 53
2005 17 833 46
2006 16 1,141 37
2007 16 1,680 47
Source: Metals Economics Group; US Geological Survey; Geosciences Australia
New frontiers
A notable feature of planned African exploration spending over the last 
few years has been the growing interest in countries such as the DRC, 
Angola, Ghana, Mali and Zambia.69 Before the current boom, these 
countries were exploration Cinderellas. Now they have well and truly 
joined the worldwide exploration ball.
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US 
Detailed data on outward FDI stocks by country and industry are 
available only for the United States. These show that the stock of US 
outward investment in Africa’s extractive sector (mining, oil and gas) 
doubled to just over US$14 billion over 2000-06 (Figure 2.2). 
According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Equatorial Guinea, 
Egypt and Chad recorded the largest increases in US FDI stocks in 
2005 (latest available detailed country data), mainly due to a rise in 
reinvested earnings of affi liates in oil and gas extraction.80 US outward 
investment in Africa’s extractive sector represents at least 50% of total 
US African investment. In no other region does mining account for 
such a high percentage of US FDI.81
Canada
Africa is also an important destination for Canadian mining companies. 
According to Natural Resources Canada, the Canadian resources 
ministry, Canadian-based mining companies doubled their African 
exploration budgets to C$195 million in 2005, which represented 22% 
of total planned exploration spending by all companies on the continent. 
NRC notes that mining companies of all sizes listed on Canadian stock 
exchanges held interests in more than 660 African mineral properties 
at the end of 2005, a rise of 70 from 2004.82 
Australia 
While the data are sparse, it is plain that Australian-listed mining 
companies are also active in Africa, starting with the two largest 
Australian-listed resource companies — BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto. 
According to their latest annual reports, around 8% of BHP’s and 
around 3% of Rio’s operating assets are African.83 The next chapter 
examines Australian investment in more detail.
South Africa
South African companies are a major source of investment in Africa, 
especially for resource-rich countries in Southern Africa. Although 
recent detailed data are wanting,84 South African companies are 
refi nery in Guinea,76 and is assessing the feasibility of developing a 
US$3 billion aluminum smelter in the DRC. BHP Billiton’s contribution 
to the investment in these two projects is estimated at US$4.7 billion. 
Another large project currently under consideration is Rio Tinto’s 
Simandou iron ore mine in Guinea. Estimated capital cost: US$6 billion.77 
This project hit the headlines in June 2008 after the government 
threatened to ‘withdraw’ and ‘reconsider’ Rio’s concession.78
'Southern' investors becoming more important
The main FDI players in SSA’s extractive sector are private sector 
companies from developed countries, mainly the United States, Canada, 
the UK and Australia, as well as companies from South Africa. While 
state-owned companies control the majority of oil and gas reserves, most 
petroleum FDI comes from multinational oil companies. In mining, 
the private sector dominates both reserves and FDI, and there is a far 
greater representation of mid-tier and junior mining companies than 
in oil and gas.79 Contrary to what the media headlines might suggest, 
Chinese companies aren’t the biggest investors — yet — though they 
could become so if some of their big announced plans come to fruition.
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Figure 2.2
United States FDI stocks in Africa’s extractive sector1
US$ billion
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (US). 1Historical cost basis.
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began much earlier. Even so, it is increasing its spending rapidly, and 
looks set to catch up, and quite possibly overtake, the major investors 
in coming years.
At US$1.6 billion, its stock of outward FDI in Africa is just shy of 
India’s US$2 billion and Malaysia’s US$1.9 billion.89 But it is dwarfed 
by investment from more traditional sources, such as the UK and the 
United States — the UK’s total African FDI stocks were US$30 billion 
in 2003; America’s, US25½  billion in 2006.90 
In the oil sector, Chinese companies are still relatively small players. 
Aside from a few projects in Sudan, Nigeria and Angola, most Chinese 
oil assets in Africa are inferior in size and quality to those held by IOCs or 
African NOCs. The estimated commercial value of Chinese companies’ 
African assets is ‘just 8% of the combined commercial value of the IOCs in 
African oil and 3% of all companies invested in African oil’.91 Chinese oil 
companies are also relatively small producers, pumping out an estimated 
267,000 barrels of oil equivalent a day (boe/d) in 2006 versus 780,000 
boe/d by ExxonMobil and 4.1 million boe/d by Algeria’s Sonatrach.92 
As for China’s FDI outfl ows, these rose by more than 400% over 
2003-05. Around 700 Chinese enterprises were reportedly active in 
Africa in 2007, up from 585 in 2002.93 
Although small compared to the more established players, China’s stake 
in SSA’s extractive sector looks set to increase markedly in coming years. 
Chinese fi rms have announced major new investments in oil exploration 
and production in countries such as Nigeria, Sudan, Angola and Gabon. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, China is thought to have invested at least 
US$4 billion94 in oil production and related infrastructure in Sudan alone. 
There has also been much recent activity on the minerals side, including 
copper projects in Zambia and copper and cobalt ones in the DRC.95 
Spearheading its new large-scale and more strategic approach are two 
recent jumbo loan offers from Beijing discussed in Chapter 1 — US$9¼ 
billion to the DRC and up to US$50 billion to Nigeria. The scale and 
terms of these credits suggest that Beijing is determined to stand behind 
its companies and orchestrate their activities.
probably the largest investors in Lesotho and Mozambique85 and major 
investors in many other African countries.86 The industry composition 
of South Africa’s outward investment is diverse, spanning telecoms, 
banking, basic materials and mining. 
In mining, South African companies are prominent investors in most 
countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) – 
which groups Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, as well as South Africa. They have also invested further 
afi eld, with Anglogold and Goldfi elds, for instance, being signifi cant 
investors in Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Namibia and Tanzania.87 
‘South-South’ investment
As the previous chapter notes, state and private companies from 
emerging markets are starting to challenge the dominance of 
developed-country enterprises in the African extractive sector. 
Companies from the so-called BRIC economies — Brazil, Russia, 
India and China — now feature prominently in Africa, as do Gulf 
countries, and to a lesser extent, Korea and Malaysia. Although 
some of this investment is commercially-driven and without direct 
state support, it often takes place against a backdrop of preferential 
credit arrangements or broader offers of infrastructure, or both. In 
addition, credit market distortions sometimes mean that state-owned 
companies (including those in which the state holds a minority stake) 
face lower hurdle rates of return and are therefore willing to undertake 
projects that private companies may not see as profi table, but which 
provide state-owned companies with a greater return than they might 
otherwise be able to earn domestically.88
The paragraphs below profi le fi ve investors from the 'South' — 
China, India, Malaysia, Brazil and Russia.
China
China is a relative latecomer to SSA resource investment, having only 
started about 15 years ago. This means that the value of its resource 
investment is today much lower than that of other countries that 
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• Leading diamond producer ALROSA has plans to develop diamond 
deposits in Guinea, Sierra Leone, South Africa and the DRC.
• In partnership with state oil company Zarubezhneft, ALROSA 
has signed a memorandum of understanding with the Angolan 
state oil company Sonangol.
As noted in Chapter 1, Gazprom also has some multi-billion gas deals 
under discussion in Nigeria.
Summary
The dominant players in the SSA resource boom are companies from 
developed countries, mainly the US, Canada and the UK, although 
there is also strong representation from Australian and South African 
resource companies. Multinational oil companies dominate petroleum 
investment, while mid-tier and junior companies are better represented 
in hard-rock mining, especially exploration. 
Despite media headlines suggesting otherwise, Chinese and Indian 
companies have — until recently at any rate — played a relatively small 
part in the boom. But that is changing fast. China is scaling up and 
diversifying both its investment in SSA and its resource diplomacy. 
Likewise India, if from a lower base. Other investors to watch are the 
Gulf sheikhdoms, Korea, Brazil, Malaysia and Russia.
India and Malaysia
Indian and Malaysian enterprises have historically been the continent’s 
leading Asian investors, accounting for the majority of FDI infl ows 
and stocks over the last decade as well as being the dominant force in 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions in Africa over 1987-2005.96 
They have traditionally invested in services and manufacturing, 
but have recently begun to expand into extractive industries. In 2003 
and 2004, India’s ONGC invested around US$900 million to acquire 
Greater Nile Petroleum and two oil exploration blocks in Sudan.97 And 
as mentioned in Chapter 1, India’s Arcelor Mittal has grabbed headlines 
with its plans to spend well in excess of US$3 billion on iron ore and 
steel projects in Mauritania, Senegal and Liberia.98
Brazil
Brazilian resource companies are also noteworthy. National oil 
company Petrobras is producing oil in Angola and exploring through 
West Africa, mainly Nigeria, as part of its planned expansion. In 
mining, Vale (previously CVRD) has recently bought into a coal project 
in Mozambique.
Russia
Like China, Russia is a latecomer to the subcontinent now trying to 
catch up.
• In 2007, Norilsk Nickel, the world’s largest nickel and palladium 
producer, bought Lion Ore, a gold miner with operations in 
Botswana and South Africa.
• Leading aluminium company Rusal has become a major investor 
in Guinea and has bought a controlling stake in Nigeria’s Alscon 
aluminium smelting company.
• Industrial holding company Renova is signing agreements to 
build a variety of plant and infrastructure for resource projects 
in South Africa.
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Dimensions of  Australian involvement
A glance through the local and international business press gives the 
distinct impression that Australian mining and resource companies are 
ramping up considerably their involvement across Africa. Numerous 
references to Australians in Africa sprinkle the pages of the Financial 
Times and Australian Financial Review. A recent article on junior 
Australian iron ore companies in the ‘The Fin’ noted that ‘Africa is also 
proving to be a happy hunting ground for Australian companies looking 
beyond their homeland’.99
However, the activity highlighted in media reports hasn’t yet 
percolated into offi cial investment data, making it diffi cult to quantify 
Australian companies’ involvement. Australian data by country and 
industry are a couple of years old and may be only a partial record 
of investment stocks and fl ows. For their part, African FDI statistics 
tend to be patchy and outdated and hardly make up for Australian data 
defi ciencies. Worse still, much investment simply escapes the attention 
of statistical agencies in both Australia and Africa.100 
Other sources are required to bridge the gap between the expected 
investment reported in the media and completed investment reported 
in offi cial investment data. Drawing on a range of sources, this chapter 
augments offi cial investment data with estimates of subsequent 
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more recent experience of rising Australian investment in Africa is not 
yet refl ected in the offi cial data published by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics.101 The strong FDI fl ows over recent times, including a sharp 
rise in 2001-02, strongly suggest that Australia’s FDI stock in Africa is 
much higher than the published values.
completed investment and investment plans for the future. 
Our updated estimates suggest an upsurge in the number of Australian 
resource and service companies chasing opportunities in Africa. What’s 
more, many of these companies have successfully raised capital from 
local and international investors to fi nance their announced plans.
Outdated offi cial data
After declining for four years in a row, the stock of direct investment 
abroad by Australian miners staged a recovery in 2005, almost doubling 
to $10.5 billion. In 2006, offshore mining investment more than doubled 
again to $26 billion (Figure 3.1)
Australian investment in Africa
Offi cial data show that Australian investment in Africa has historically 
been relatively small, particularly compared to destinations such as the 
US, UK and New Zealand. 
Still, outward FDI stocks in South Africa have been rising and 
are now around 14 times higher than their level in the early 1990s. 
Australian investment stocks in the rest of Africa have at times been 
substantial, peaking in 1997 at A$1.55 billion (Figure 3.2), but the 
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Australian investment in Africa and South Africa1
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1 Combined total of direct, portfolio and financial derivative categories.  
2 No data published beyond 200102.  No stocks data published for 1999-00.
3 From 2001, data published on a calendar year basis. Not directly comparable 
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• Intermet Engineering — contracts with Anvil Mining in the DRC.
• Worley Parsons’ Nigerian operating entity, DeltaAfrik — fi ve-year 
US$220m contract to provide engineering, procurement and contract 
management (EPCM) services to Mobil Producing Nigeria.
• GRD Minproc
• US$54 million EPCM contract with a subsidiary of 
Resolute Mining to redevelop the Syama gold mine in 
Mali.
• Contract to project manage construction of Paladin 
Resources’ US$125 million Langer Heinrich uranium 
mine in Namibia.
• EPCM contract with Freeport-McMoRan for the US$650 
million Tenke Fungurume copper/cobalt project in the 
DRC.
• Ausenco 
• Appointment as preferred contractor for Anvil Mining’s 
US$238 million Kinsevere Stage II Copper Project in the 
DRC. 
• Designing and building the copper concentrator at 
Equinox’s Lumwana copper mine in Zambia.
• Lycopodium
• EPCM contract to design and build Barrick Gold’s 
US$400 million Buzwagi gold mine in Tanzania. 
• Feasibility studies and EPCM services for two 
Newmont-controlled gold mines in Ghana.
In addition to these large and prominent companies, numerous 
smaller companies are active. For example, Byrnecut Mining, a 
contract miner, has undertaken work in Tanzania and has secured 
a contract to build and operate AIM Resources’ underground zinc 
mine in Burkina Faso. 
More recent evidence
More up-to-date, if partial, evidence shows that numerous Australian 
mining and petroleum companies are active in Africa and involved 
in a wide range of ventures at all stages — exploration, construction 
and production. 
Companies in the hundreds
Several analysts and commentators have tried to identify the number 
of Australian resource and engineering companies operating in the 
SSA resource sector, with mixed success. One thing most analysts 
and commentators agree on is that the number of Australian resource 
and resource service companies operating in Africa is well into the 
hundreds. According to an estimate in the Africa Research Bulletin, 
around 330 Australian companies, from small equipment suppliers 
to multinationals, are involved in mining in southern Africa alone.102 
The most popular countries are reported to be South Africa, Namibia, 
Botswana and Mozambique.
Other sources suggest similar numbers. According to 2006 annual 
report data collated by the consultancy Aspect Huntley, around 80 
companies of all sizes in the energy and materials industry categories 
listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) have interests in Africa 
— either as explorer or producer.103 
ASX data may understate the total number of Australian mining 
companies active in Africa. In the last two years, listings by Australian 
mining companies on London’s Alternative Investment Market (AIM), 
especially by juniors, have surged, a trend largely motivated by the depth 
of the City of London’s fi nancial markets and their long history of backing 
African mineral projects, especially speculative exploration ones. A wide 
range of private companies are also active in Africa’s natural resources 
sector, including small drilling companies and mining consultancies.
If mining service companies, such as engineering, geological and 
technical consultants, maintenance providers and construction fi rms, 
are added in, the number of Australian-based companies active in 
Africa would increase considerably. Notable examples include: 
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publicly available information about existing and prospective projects 
suggested that investments by Australian resource companies in Africa 
could be worth up to US$15 billion.109 
Using more recent, publicly available data, we estimate that actual 
and prospective investment by Australian resource (and engineering) 
companies in Africa could be worth close to US$20 billion. This estimate 
includes: operating assets of well-established Australian resource 
producers in Africa; capital outlays on new mines and development 
projects; African sales revenues of engineering companies; and 
projected capital costs (as reported in the fi nancial press) associated 
with four large prospective projects by BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto and 
Sphere Investments (Figure 3.3). True, this estimate is a mix of sunk 
and planned spending (plus contract revenue) over various timeframes. 
But it strongly suggests that Africa is an important region for Australian 
resource companies. 
Capital raising worldwide
As already noted, Australian companies have raised large sums for 
their African ventures from local and international investors on the 
Australian-based companies have also been active in Africa’s 
petroleum sector. Until recently, Woodside was the largest 
Australian-based petroleum investor in SSA through its 47% joint 
venture stake in Mauritania’s Chinguetti fi eld. But the company recently 
sold its interest in the fi eld to Malaysia’s Petronas. Woodside still has an 
exploration foothold in Kenya, Liberia and Sierra Leone, all prospective 
oil-producing countries, as well as in Algeria and Libya.104 
Small and mid-sized Australian-based companies remain active: Roc 
Oil is exploring and producing in Angola and exploring in Equatorial 
Guinea and Mauritania. In North Africa, Oil Search is in Libya. 
‘Investment’ in the billions
Estimating the value of Australian resource company involvement in 
African projects is more diffi cult than counting companies. 
Some companies, such as BHP Billiton through the 2001 merger of 
BHP with Billiton, have a substantial investment in Southern Africa; 
this investment now totals just over US$4 billion, or around 8% of total 
operating assets, according to BHP Billiton’s most recent annual report.105 
Rio Tinto has African mining assets worth almost US$2.1 billion, or 
around 3% of operating assets.106 Although Woodside has divested 
its joint venture interests in Mauritania, its initial US$550 million 
investment in the offshore Chinguetti oilfi eld in 2004 was Mauritania’s 
largest single greenfi eld FDI project that year.107 
Other companies have only just started to explore prospective deposits 
or assess the fi nancial viability of known reserves and have spent 
comparatively small amounts. For example, in Namibia, Deep Yellow has 
struck a US$20 million deal to acquire three uranium exploration permits 
covering about 2,600 square kilometres. Several junior uranium explorers 
are active in Guinea, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Zambia. 
One Australian company between these two categories is Riversdale 
Mining in Mozambique. It has sold a 35% stake in its coal deposit to 
India’s Tata conglomerate for A$100 million and is seeking to raise 
A$235 million of fresh equity capital to develop the project.108
A back-of-the-envelope estimate by the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade in February 2007 using a mix of confi dential and 
Figure 3.3
Existing and prospective Australian resource investment in Africa
Large
established
investments
BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto
US$6.2b
New mines ... mining services ... 
late stage development
Equinox, Paladin, Anvil, Rio Tinto, Ausenco, Ausdrill
US$2.5b
Prospects ... ‘super projects’ ... exploration ... early stage development
BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, Sphere + juniors
US$11.1b +
Lots more could bubble up ...
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around US$159 million on African exploration in 2006, making them the 
third biggest spenders behind South African and Canadian companies.117 
Diverse mix of interests
Exploration bias
Australian fi rms are heavily involved in mineral exploration — much 
highly speculative or at a very early stage — and development. Fewer 
companies are running mines.
Aspect Huntley data suggest that almost two-thirds of ASX-listed 
companies in the energy and materials industries are focused on 
exploration. The rest appear to be either actively producing or moving 
towards production.118 Australian companies focused on exploration in 
Africa include:
• Bannerman Resources, exploring for uranium in Namibia and 
Botswana
• Paramount Resources, exploring for diamonds in Ghana and 
South Africa
• Azumah Resources, exploring for gold in Ghana
• Roc Oil, exploring for oil in Angola and Equatorial Guinea (as 
well as holding an interest in Mauritania’s Chinguetti oilfi eld) 
• Sundance Resources, proving up an iron ore resource in 
Cameroon
• Sphere Investments, part of an iron ore joint venture in Mauritania
• Adamus Resources, proving up a gold project in Ghana
• Gryphon Minerals, exploring for gold in Burkina Faso
• Discovery Metals, proving up a copper project in Botswana
• Zambezi Resources, exploring for copper and gold in Zambia
• Tiger Resources, exploring for copper and cobalt in the DRC
• Moto Gold Mines, exploring for and proving up gold deposits in 
the DRC
• Riversdale Mining, exploring for and proving up coal deposits in 
Mozambique.
ASX, the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and AIM. The majority of 
the world’s public mining and energy companies are listed on these 
three exchanges. 
According to HLB Mann Judd, an accounting fi rm, companies in 
the energy and materials sectors110 accounted for three-quarters of 
small-cap IPOs on the ASX in 2006, raising around A$610 million.111 
While most of this sum was raised by small exploration companies with 
an Australian focus, around A$32 million was raised by companies to 
explore and develop in Africa.
In 2006, TSX-listed mining companies raised just over US$10 billion, 
or around 38% of the worldwide sum of capital raised by listed mining 
companies.112 The TSX (including the small-cap TSX-Venture Exchange) 
has the largest concentration of listed mining companies in the world. 
Mining companies account for almost 60% of the TSX’s total listings. 
Several Australian-based companies have listed on the TSX to raise 
capital for African ventures: Moto Goldmines, which raised C$42 million 
at its 2005 listing; Equinox, which raised C$145 million in a concurrent 
Canadian and Australian share offering before its 2005 TSX listing to 
develop the world’s largest open-cut copper mine in Zambia; and Anvil 
Mining, which raised C$7 million at its 2004 TSX debut.113 
Nine Australian-based resource companies listed on the AIM 
in 2006, raising a total £427 million (through IPOs and private 
placements). Their raisings accounted for just over two-fi fths of the 
£1 billion in new capital raised by AIM resource companies.114 Although 
most of these companies were focused on domestic or non-African 
international projects, almost £43.7 million was raised by Sylvania 
Resources, a company with gold interests in southern Africa.115 Other 
Australian-based resource companies to have listed on the AIM in 
recent years include First Quantum Minerals, which raised £46 million 
at its 2001 AIM debut.116
Big exploration spenders
Finally, Australian companies are an important source of African 
exploration spending. According to Natural Resources Canada, the 
Canadian resources ministry, Australian companies budgeted to spend 
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A search of stories on Factiva, an online news archive, suggests that 
Australian companies are active in a wide range of countries, including 
South Africa, Guinea, DRC, Tanzania, Botswana and Zambia, and to a 
lesser extent in Namibia, Ghana, Mali, Niger and Mauritania. Australian 
companies are chasing a wide span of resource targets, ranging through 
gold, base metals, diamonds, uranium and petroleum (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: Five most frequently mentioned target countries
and resources
Countries Mentions (% total)
South Africa 14
Congo-Kinshasa 10
Tanzania 10
Botswana 8
Zambia 8
Target resource Mentions (% total)
Gold 20
Uranium 18
Diamonds 12
Petroleum 12
Copper 10
Source: Factiva 
Large companies dominate production 
While exploration is mainly undertaken by juniors, production is largely 
the preserve of mid-sized and larger companies. Examples of mid-sized 
and large Australian-based companies producing or with interests in 
productive operations in SSA include:
• Rio Tinto, with majority interests in mines producing diamonds 
(Zimbabwe), uranium (Namibia), copper (South Africa) and 
titanium dioxide (South Africa). Rio is also developing an 
iron ore mine in Guinea and a titanium dioxide project in 
Madagascar 
• BHP Billiton, with coal, manganese, mineral sands and aluminum 
interests in southern Africa and petroleum interests in Algeria
• Paladin Resource’s Langer Heinrich uranium mine in Namibia, 
which began production in March 2007
• Equinox’s Lumwana copper mine in Zambia. 
Smaller companies producing are: Anvil Mining, producing copper and 
silver in the DRC since 2002; and Resolute Mining, producing gold in 
Tanzania since 1998.
In addition, a clutch of smaller Australian-based mining companies 
are at an advanced stage of development or working towards full 
production. These include:
• Mineral Deposits, planning to start production in 2009 from its 
US$163 million mineral sands project in Senegal
• Albidon, close to completing a US$92 million nickel mine 
in Zambia.
Increasing geographic and resource spread 
Another feature of Australia’s recent involvement in the African 
extractive sector is growing geographical diversifi cation. While South 
Africa continues to loom large in plans and budgets, there is also 
strong interest in other African countries, particularly dangerous and 
diffi cult ones. 
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project management companies through to single-operator 
geological consultancies. The larger mining service companies 
have secured contracts to work on African resource projects 
worth at least US$4 billion. These companies now make big 
money from African projects. As an example, service company 
Ausdrill made 42% of its sales revenue in 2007 from Africa.
The range of target resources and countries is broad. Australian 
companies are fanning out from Southern Africa, the favoured 
investment destination in the past, to pursue opportunities in countries 
as diverse as Guinea, the DRC, Ghana, Burkina Faso and Mali. 
Australia’s stake in the African extractive sector could grow 
signifi cantly if four large prospective projects involving BHP Billiton, Rio 
Tinto and Sphere investments eventuate. BHP Billiton has a one-third 
interest in Global Alumina’s proposed US$4.8 billion Sangarédi alumina 
refi nery in Guinea. The company also has plans to investigate the 
viability of a potential US$3 billion aluminium smelter in the DRC. Rio 
Tinto’s Simandou iron ore project in Guinea has an estimated capital 
cost of US$6 billion.119 As noted earlier, its future is clouded at present, 
because the Guinean government in June 2008 decided to ‘withdraw’ 
and ‘reconsider’ Rio’s concession. Nevertheless, most observers believe 
this is just a gambit by the government to gain a greater slice of project 
revenues, rather than a move to expropriate. Finally, Sphere Investments’ 
25.05% stake in the Guelb el Aouj Iron Ore Project in Mauritania, with 
an estimated capital cost of US$1.9 billion, could see Australia’s SSA 
investment stake rise by a further US$475 million.
What are the big messages from all these numbers? First, SSA 
is becoming a place that matters increasingly to Australian resource 
companies. Second, the dependence is two-way: Australian resource 
companies now matter for the development of the subcontinent’s 
resource sector as well — especially for its minerals. 
Summary
Australian-based mining and petroleum companies, along with 
companies that service these companies, have a substantial and 
growing commercial presence in Africa. A back-of-the-envelope 
estimate puts total existing and prospective Australian investment in 
African resource projects in the vicinity of US$20 billion. Table 3.2 
breaks down this estimate.
• Large established investments. According to their 2007 
annual reports, BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto have a stake of 
around US$6.2 billion in African operating assets. Mid-tier and 
smaller resource companies, such as Anvil Mining and Resolute 
Mining, also have substantial investments in African projects. 
• Exploration. Much Australian activity centres on exploration, 
some of it highly speculative. While the majors are ramping 
up their exploration spending in Africa, junior companies are 
probably in the vanguard. Supported by buoyant equity raisings 
made before the January worldwide sharemarket correction, 
junior companies are pushing into a wide range of African 
countries. Next to South African and Canadian companies, 
Australian companies are Africa’s third largest source of 
exploration spending.
• Construction. Australian companies have been building 
signifi cant new mines, such as Equinox’s US$765 million 
Lumwana copper mine. Other mines under construction that 
will start producing in the next couple of years include Albidon’s 
Munali nickel mine in Zambia and Anvil’s Kinsevere (Stage 2) 
copper mine in the DRC.
• Mining service companies. Australia’s push into SSA's 
natural resource sector also involves numerous mining service 
companies of various sizes, from integrated engineering and 
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Total investment (cont.)
Construction or 
development
Mining services Countries
Signifi cant new mines 
and others under 
construction
Large and small mining 
service companies are 
active in Africa
Companies are 
branching out from 
Southern Africa
Equinox Minerals 
Lumwana copper mine, 
Zambia, US$765m
Paladin Resources
Langer Heinrich 
uranium mine, 
Namibia, US$125m
Rio Tinto
Mineral sands, 
Madagascar, US$585m
Albidon 
Munali nickel mine, 
Zambia, US$92m
Anvil Mining
Kinsevere (stage 
2) copper mine, 
Congo-Kinshasa, 
US$238m
AIM Resources
Underground zinc 
mine in Burkina Faso, 
US$73m
Worley Parsons
Nigeria, US$220m 
EPCM contract
GRD Minproc
African sales revenues 
of A$84.2m in 2007
Secured work on 
African projects with 
a total capital cost of 
around A$2.5b
Ausdrill
African projects 
generated A$156m in 
revenues in 2007
Ausenco
African projects 
generated A$197m in 
sales in 2007. Secured 
work on African projects 
with a total capital cost 
of US$620m for period 
2006-2008 & in running 
to work on projects 
worth US$720m
Traditional favourites
South Africa
Botswana
Namibia
Branching out
DRC
Mali
Burkina Faso
Ghana
Guinea
Kenya
Mauritania
Equatorial Guinea
Mozambique
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Nigeria
Zambia
Sources:  Austrade; ASX; TSX; AIM; Natural Resources Canada; company websites, 
presentations and annual reports, Factiva. 
1 A combination of sunk and planned expenditures, project announcements, revenues over 
various timeframes 
Note: Assets, capital raisings, capital values and revenues have been rounded to the nearest 
whole number or one decimal place.
Table 3.2: Dimensions of Australia’s involvement in Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s natural resources sector
Total investment: More than US$20 billion of existing 
and prospective projects1
Large established 
investments
Exploration
Capital raisings 
(2006)
Australian companies 
already have large 
stakes in Africa
Australian companies 
have increased African 
exploration budgets and 
spending
Juniors have raised 
equity capital through 
IPOs and private 
placements
Large
BHP Billiton, South 
Africa, Algeria US$4b
Rio Tinto, South 
Africa, Zimbabwe, 
Namibia, US$2.1b
Mid-tier/small
Anvil Mining, DRC, 
US$228 m
Resolute Mining, 
Tanzania, A$81m
Survey (MEG)
African non-ferrous 
exploration budgets of 
Australian companies 
were US$160m 
in 2006, making 
Australian companies 
the third largest source 
of African exploration 
spending behind South 
Africa and Canada
ASX
6 listings, A$32m
TSX
No Africa-focused 
listings in 2006, but 
some large capital 
raisings in previous 
years
AIM
1 new listing, £44m
Prospective ‘super’ projects
BHP Billiton
Alumina refi nery in partnership with Global Alumina, Guinea, US$4.8b
(⅓ joint venture stake); Aluminium smelter, DRC, US$3b
Rio Tinto
Iron ore mine and infrastructure, Guinea, US$6b
Sphere Investments
Iron ore project, Mauritania, US$475m
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Chapter 4
Implications for companies and public policy
This chapter discusses implications of the push by Australian companies 
into the SSA resource sector — for the companies themselves and for 
Australian public policy. 
First, however, it looks at an important prior issue: is the push 
sustainable? The answer we offer is a qualifi ed yes. 
Is the push sustainable? 
Three of the four drivers of the current boom look sustainable into the 
medium and long term: high commodity prices, a global savings glut and 
the New Great Game. There could be a spanner in the works, however: 
backsliding by African countries themselves — into stagfl ation, 
economic nationalism, coups, war and other investment repellents. As 
noted in Chapter 1, a trend toward better domestic fundamentals is 
perceptible. But it is only a modest and fi tful one, and several countries 
are defying it. If instability and violence again become the norm, the 
boom could easily collapse. 
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rates will fall. The politicians, offi cials and industrialists who make the 
investment decisions have woken up to this fact: it’s time to move on 
from crisis management to tackle long-term growth issues. So they are 
embarking on big plans to expand capacity.
A joint Asian Development Bank, Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation and World Bank study estimated in 2005 that East 
Asia alone needs US$1 trillion of infrastructure over the next fi ve 
years.122 More recently, India has estimated that it will need to 
spend US$320 billion over the next fi ve years. Indonesia says US$70 
billion. Malaysia has plans for several trade zones, notably the US$51 
billion Northern Corridor Economic Region and the US$13½ billion 
Iskandar Development Region in Johor. The Philippines wants to 
spend US$37 billion over the next three years, while Vietnam plans 
to tap international capital markets to fi nance projects.123 The Thai 
government recently announced that it plans to spend US$50 billion-
56 billion on infrastructure projects over 2008-11.124
These are large sums, but they are likely to erode the global savings 
glut only gradually, rather than eliminate it suddenly. This is because 
two other substantial economies have large and persistent savings 
surpluses (as measured by their external current account surpluses). 
China’s is about US$375 billion and the Gulf economies’ (more 
precisely Gulf Cooperation Council) US$250 billion. Each surplus 
looks as if it will persist into the medium term at least. China is the 
one East Asian economy that has a capacity glut rather than defi ciency, 
and the authorities there are restraining investment. Academic analysis 
suggests that Chinese savings and investment will both decline mildly 
in the coming two decades, but the savings surplus is unlikely to turn 
into a defi cit soon.125 In the Gulf, strenuous efforts are underway to 
increase both consumption and investment spending, but they are being 
outstripped by the volume of petrodollar earnings gushing in.
So it is unlikely that rising investment in the surplus-savings countries 
of East Asia and the Gulf will crowd out to any great extent prospective 
African resource investment for some years to come.
And the global credit squeeze-cum-sharemarket correction? The 
provisional conclusion reached in Chapter 1 is that this will cause only 
High commodity prices
There might be some froth and bubble in current commodity prices that 
the current world economic slowdown will blow off. But as Chapter 1 
discussed, the omens are good that prices won’t return to either their turn-
of-century levels or long-term trend. The reasons are twofold: ‘Chindia’ 
and rising marginal costs. The continuing integration into the world 
economy of China and India — economies with a combined population 
of almost 2½ billion, or 38% of the world total — is causing demand for 
minerals and energy to expand at a faster rate than at any time before. 
Meanwhile, resource suppliers are facing ‘continuing challenges in terms 
of higher energy costs, potentially higher exploration costs, declining ore 
grades, and increasing environmental and social constraints, including 
water issues’.120 This combination of burgeoning demand and inelastic 
supply is a classic recipe for high and rising prices.
Certainly, the perception that prices will stay ‘stronger for longer’ is a 
common one among resource companies. A typical view was expressed 
in January by Owen Hegarty, managing director and CEO of the ASX-
listed international mining company Oxiana Resources. He said that he 
had not seen any slowing of Asian demand for his company’s copper, 
gold and zinc. ‘The fundamentals remain very strong.’121
Global savings glut
There is more doubt about the sustainability of the global savings glut. 
One of its causes is the ‘investment drought’ that arose in Asia after 
the onset of the 1997-98 fi nancial crisis. Over-investment in the lead-
up to the crisis had been rife, and a key way economies got back onto 
their feet in the aftermath was to curtail investment. As a result, the 
investment share of GDP in Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand fell by 10 percentage points on 
average. One consequence of this investment retrenchment was the 
generation of large saving surpluses that entered world capital markets 
and pressed down real interest rates. Now, however, after several years 
of fast growth, most East Asian economies are running into capacity 
constraints — both in public infrastructure and private industry. If 
they don’t ease those constraints through investment, GDP growth 
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Incidentally, Rajan makes it plain that he has no quarrel with 
commercial, profi t-motivated investment by state-owned or -directed 
companies that makes good business sense ‘untainted by specious 
claims of enhancing national security’.126 Such investment does exist. 
For instance, while a large share of Gulf investment in Africa is done by 
state-owned enterprises, this investment seems to be driven by a largely 
commercial agenda, with strategic or mercantilist interests taking a 
back seat.127
The growing importance of so-called South-South capital fl ows 
between developing countries — investment, lending and even foreign 
aid — is another important support for the New Great Game. (Such 
fl ows stand in contrast to the traditional ‘North-South’ fl ows from 
developed to developing countries.) From negligible levels just a decade 
ago, the proportion of FDI received by developing countries from other 
developing countries is now around 40%.128 Since state-owned and 
state-directed companies channel a large proportion of South-South 
fl ows, it seems inevitable that political, strategic and mercantilist 
motives will exert a continuing, if not growing, infl uence on investment 
in the subcontinent’s resource sector.
African fundamentals
It is hard to say how durable recent improvements in the SSA investment 
climate will be.
On average, violence is down, and political and economic stability 
are up, considerably when comparing now with the 1970s, 1980s or 
even 1990s. Yet as Chapter 1 has discussed, one can’t be confi dent that 
the improvements are entrenched. Certainly, governments seem to have 
decisively ditched the old policies of nationalisation, collectivisation 
and import-substituting industrialisation that so impoverished them 
in the immediate post-colonial period. But this still leaves a lot of 
scope for fi scal and monetary mismanagement, half-baked or arbitrary 
intervention in business, and so-called resource nationalism — attempts 
by governments to garner a greater share of resource rents from the 
commodity boom by modifying tax and royalty rates and production-
sharing and equity agreements. 
a marginal withdrawal of capital from the African resource sector. After 
all, the long-term structural drivers of the sector remain intact, and the 
resource fi nance market is quite removed from the problems of the 
structured fi nance markets. This view was shared at two recent keynote 
conferences on African mining — the Mines & Money conference in 
London in November 2007 and the Indaba Conference in Cape Town 
in February 2008.
New Great Game
The forces underlying the New Great Game seem if anything to be 
strengthening — the drive to secure supplies of raw materials for home 
industries, to fi nd new supplies to replace dwindling home supplies, 
and to diversify asset portfolios. 
The former IMF economic counsellor Raghuram Rajan worries that 
much of the so-called strategic investment to secure raw materials for 
home industries could be irrational — either ineffective or ineffi cient. 
His argument is this. It is legitimate for a country to seek to protect itself 
from commodity price increases or supply disruptions. But don’t do so by 
putting money into insecure and unprofi table mines in unstable countries 
where they are prone to expropriation and sabotage. Instead, buy shares in 
international resource companies and use derivatives such as oil futures 
to hedge your risk if you’re worried about exposure to commodity price 
increases. And establish strategic stockpiles of materials and encourage 
effi cient resource use if you’re worried about a ‘Mad Max’ world of war, 
trade collapse and autarky. These are much better means to your ends.
One could go on to argue that insofar as such investment is irrational, 
its perpetrators will eventually see the error of their ways, and stop. But 
this is far from assured in the short term. The Chinese, for instance, 
seem to be embarking on a grand strategy for the wholesale exploitation 
of African minerals and petroleum, using billions of dollars of China 
Eximbank and Sinosure loans to build transport networks that will 
facilitate the export of resources from mines and oil and gas fi elds 
in which they have also invested. Nit-picking cost-benefi t analyses 
of individual projects are unlikely to deter them, at least until they 
experience some major loss, fi nancial or otherwise.
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Political violence has also sometimes been a problem. In 1999, 
diamond mines in the DRC, some of them foreign-owned, were seized 
by offi cials of the former dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. Rebel forces 
attacked a rutile mine and processing facility in Sierra Leone in 1995 
owned by America’s Nord Resources Corporation. Hostages were taken 
and production suspended for months. The US government’s foreign 
investment support agency OPIC paid an almost US$16 million political 
risk insurance claim to Nord as a result of the attack.129
Problems for resource companies continue down to the present. 
For all the improvement in African investment climates, companies, 
including Australian ones, still regularly fall victim to political instability 
and violence, criticism for being bad corporate citizens, and ‘creeping’ 
expropriation. 
Although SSA governments aren’t yet proving to be as 
confrontational as Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, they are engaging 
in acts of resource nationalism.
They are also among the most corrupt in the world, so another challenge 
is how to do business while avoiding complicity in corruption and adhering 
to various anti-corruption laws in one’s own and other countries.
Finally, strategic competition for resources from state-owned and 
state-directed companies — what we have called the New Great Game 
— is throwing up a separate set of challenges.
Political instability and violence 
Whereas mines and oilfi elds are often immune from domestic 
macroeconomic instability, they are far more susceptible to political 
instability and violence. Because they import most of their inputs, 
besides labour, and often export all their output, they can often react 
to local booms and slumps with a shrug. Riots, coups, strikes and the 
like are a different matter.130 By its very nature, a mine is site-specifi c, 
the antithesis of a footloose industry. If confl ict breaks out, the company 
can roll out a contingency plan involving production shutdowns, plant 
mothballing, staff evacuations and the like. But no matter how painstaking 
it has been, it will still be vulnerable to casualties and damage. 
Several recent incidents illustrate this point.
Similarly, on the security front, one can reasonably expect renewed 
outbreaks of violence — the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region 
and the border region between Sudan, Chad and the Central African 
Republic in particular remain areas of insecurity.
On balance?
The external drivers of the subcontinent’s resource boom look durable. 
But the all-important local conditions could yet deteriorate, after 
showing some promising improvement this decade. This could stop the 
boom in its tracks. After all, previous international commodity booms 
passed the subcontinent by, because it lacked the necessary domestic 
pre-conditions for investment.
Implications for Australian companies
What are the implications for Australian resource companies of their 
push into Africa?
The obvious one is that they will take on increased risk — and 
unfamiliar risk at that. This won’t necessarily be the case at the industry 
level — investors will still be able to pick a portfolio of companies 
with different risk profi les to diversify away risk. It might even be that 
increasing African exposure offers broad diversifi cation benefi ts.
Still, individual companies will need to give thought to how they manage 
the ‘surface risks’ — as mining and petroleum people like to call them — 
because there is no escaping the fact that SSA is a hazardous place.
Throughout the post-colonial period, resource companies operating 
in Africa have suffered fi nancial loss arising from various political 
risks, including nationalisation, licence cancellation, unfair tax and 
regulatory changes, currency inconvertibility and political violence. 
Although there haven’t been any cases of naked asset-grabs without 
compensation, nationalisation of the Zambian and Zairean copper 
industries and Nigerian oil industry in the 1970s did cause losses 
for foreign investors, as did other nationalisations in Gabon, Guinea, 
Mauritania and Niger. 
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and broader country. (Some no doubt are, but the majority doesn’t seem to 
be.) Companies are also often blamed for the ‘Resource Curse’ that affl icts 
resource-rich developing countries (see Box 2, pp 77-8).
The challenges are especially acute in countries with a record of 
human rights abuses or corruption. In these, companies are liable to 
be accused of propping up illegitimate, repressive regimes through 
their tax and royalty payments. An especially sensitive issue is when 
government security forces protecting company assets subjugate local 
citizens such as activists and artisanal miners. (Artisanal miners are 
individuals or small groups eking out a penny-pinching existence from 
small-scale mining with little or no mechanisation, sometimes illegally.) 
If not managed carefully, these issues can undermine the value of a 
company, either as investors sell its shares, or because companies feel 
obliged to turn down otherwise lucrative investments. According to a 
survey in 2002 by the specialist risk consultancy Control Risks, 20% 
of resource companies claimed to have put off an otherwise attractive 
investment because of human rights concerns.133
• Shell/Nigeria. The best-known instance of loss from ‘reputational 
risk’ is the hostile campaign Shell faced in 1995 when the Nigerian 
government executed Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other prominent 
environmental and social activists who had been campaigning 
against the oil industry. A public outcry against Shell ensued for 
allegedly providing support, including transport and weapons, to 
the Nigerian authorities to put down dissent in Ogoniland — the 
Niger Delta region where Saro-Wiwa campaigned. Relatives of 
Saro-Wiwa sued Shell in America under the Alien Tort Claims 
Act.134 This law allows US courts to hear any civil action by an 
alien for a tort committed in violation of international law or a 
US treaty obligation. Shell's Nigerian trouble came shortly after 
it received separate criticism for wanting to dispose of its Brent 
Spar offshore oil storage facilty in Atlantic waters. The two 
experiences prompted Shell to incorporate CSR principles into its 
General Business Principles, the guidelines all Shell companies 
and contractors are expected to follow.
• Nigeria. Armed militants have recently stepped up their attacks 
on oil export facilities and pipelines in the oil-rich Niger Delta, 
shutting in131 up to a quarter of Nigeria’s total oil production. For 
instance, Shell shut in about 500,000 barrels a day of production, 
or half its total daily Nigerian output from its fi elds in the Western 
Delta, after rebels attacked several production and export facilities 
in early 2006. Companies also have to put up with ‘bunkering’ 
of an estimated 100,000 barrels a day — the stealing by criminal 
gangs of oil for sale on the spot market.132 Since January 2006, the 
rebels have also taken hundreds of foreign oil workers hostage. 
• Mauritania. A 2005 coup in Mauritania triggered an immediate 
slide in the share prices of the three Australian companies in the 
consortium operating the offshore Chinguetti oilfi eld at the time 
— Woodside, Hardman Resources and Roc Oil.
• Guinea. A general strike in February 2007, limiting bauxite 
production and exports, raised concerns of a 'global supply shock' 
and fl ow-on effect to downstream alumina and aluminium industries 
— Guinea is the world’s largest bauxite exporter. During seven 
weeks of strife more than 115 people were reportedly killed. At the 
height of the troubles, world alumina prices jumped 5% and the big 
foreign investors — BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto — evacuated staff. 
• Ethiopia. In April 2007, 74 workers (nine Chinese, 65 
Ethiopians) from China’s Zhoungyan Petroleum Exploration 
Bureau were killed during an attack by armed men on an oilfi eld 
in Ethiopia’s eastern Somali province. Zhoungyan had been 
carrying out seismic surveying for Petronas and Sinopec. 
Public criticism 
Resource companies in SSA have to deal not only with the reality of diffi cult 
local conditions, but the perceptions of NGOs, shareholder activists and 
investigative journalists. These often harbour the pre-conceived notion that 
companies are out to profi teer with little concern for the local community 
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Dikulushi copper-silver mine in Katanga province in 2004.138 
On two occasions, government troops using trucks and aircraft 
commandeered from Anvil fought a renegade militia group. In 
the process they killed a number of civilians, who had helped 
the militia, and looted property. Anvil says it had no choice 
but to comply with the government’s request for transport — a 
senior staff member was reportedly struck with a rifl e butt after 
initially refusing the army’s request. The Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation’s Four Corners current affairs program aired a TV 
story on 6 June 2005 critical of Anvil’s role.
Box 2:
The Resource Curse … Or How Wealth Can Make You Poor139
The term Resource Curse refers to the paradox that countries 
rich in minerals and hydrocarbons (and sometimes soft 
commodities like timber) often have lower economic growth 
rates and per capita incomes than less well-endowed countries. 
Worse, natural resources are often associated, indeed seen 
to trigger and prolong, civil wars. Resource-rich developed 
countries have shown themselves able to ward off the Curse 
— Australia, Canada and Norway. But not so developing 
countries, with a few exceptions — Botswana, Chile, Malaysia 
and South Africa.
Why? One view says the very process of resource extraction 
is to blame. This can lead to the extreme conclusion that 
countries are better off leaving resources in the ground. 
A more moderate and reasonable view says the problem 
lies in the host countries’ management of resource earnings. 
Mismanagement leads to stagnation, boom/slump, confl ict. 
Wise management: strong growth and stability.
If mismanaged, large windfall revenues can severely distort 
the economy and corrupt the political system. By triggering 
wage infl ation and real exchange rate appreciation they can 
squeeze non-resource industries, particularly those exposed 
 • Barrick Gold/Tanzania. In a 2007 report, CorpWatch, an NGO 
monitoring the mining industry, claimed that more than 50 
miners were murdered at Barrick Gold’s Bulyanhulu property in 
Tanzania in 1996, three years before the company acquired the 
project. Barrick, a Canadian company, is the world’s leading gold 
producer. CorpWatch said that the company had ‘done nothing 
to bring the perpetrators to justice or compensate the victims’ 
families’. A 2002 report by the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman 
of the World Bank concluded that no evidence to support the 
initial allegation existed.135
• Anvil Mining/DRC. In 2006, a mob of artisanal miners lashed out 
at facilities of the Kulu-Kolwezi mine in Katanga province owned 
by the dual ASX/Toronto-listed Anvil Mining. They set fi re to a 
guest house, killing one Anvil employee and one security guard. 
The trigger: an artisanal miner found drowned at the minesite. 
Anvil security guards, who had repeatedly chased off trespassing 
artisanal miners from the site, were blamed for the killing. NGOs 
frequently cite this incident as an example of the tensions that can 
build between artisanal and corporate miners.136
• AngloGold Ashanti/DRC. NGO Human Rights Watch has 
accused South Africa's AngloGold Ashanti of providing logistical 
and fi nancial support to a militia group, the Lendu Nationalist 
and Integrationist Front (FNI), in 2005. FNI, one of four rebel 
groups in the Ituri province in the north-eastern DRC, has been 
linked to numerous atrocities, including murder of civilians. 
The company admits that staff at its Mongbwalu exploration 
camp, under fear of attack, paid armed FNI rebels a one-off 
sum of US$8,000 from petty cash, but rejects allegations that 
the company established a collaboration or partnership with the 
rebel group.137
• Anvil Mining/DRC. NGOs accuse Anvil Mining of complicity 
in human rights violations by Congolese troops near Anvil’s 
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Creeping expropriation 
While 1950s-style outright expropriations are now out of fashion around 
the world, including in Africa, that doesn’t preclude governments 
shifting the legal and regulatory goalposts facing projects in ways that 
reduce shareholder value.
• DRC. In 2007, the Toronto-listed, but Perth-based Moto 
Goldmines had its licence to develop a lucrative gold deposit in 
north-eastern DRC revoked amid allegations, which it disputes, 
that it didn’t fulfi l its work obligations under the licence. 
• Gabon/Ghana. Even in countries considered to have comparatively 
good governance such as Gabon and Ghana, foreign investors have 
reported numerous disputes with governments over what they 
claim is expropriation or discriminatory treatment. 
Resource nationalism 
Most resource companies would concede that host country governments 
and citizens have a right to share the revenue bonanzas the current 
international commodity boom is creating, whether through taxation or 
equity participation, or both. So there is little in-principle opposition to 
moves by governments to shift the terms of resource projects in the host 
country’s favour as prices have rallied. Disquiet does arise, however, 
where governments are perceived to be killing the goose that lays the 
golden eggs; for instance, by increasing taxes to rates that a low-cost 
producer can bear, but not an average or marginal producer.
• Nigeria. In January 2008, the Nigerian government said it would 
seek to renegotiate contracts covering production from offshore 
oilfi elds. The review, starting in late 2007, is part of the Yar’Adua 
government’s wide-ranging reforms of the energy sector. The 
large international oil companies in Nigeria — Shell, Chevron, 
ExxonMobil and Total — operate offshore facilities under 
production-sharing agreements, most of which were signed 
to international competition — leading countries to catch the 
so-called Dutch disease, as Holland did in the 1970s after it 
developed its giant Groningen gas fi eld.
Windfalls can also encourage rent-seeking, corruption 
and spendthrift fi scal habits. Often governments myopically 
increase spending as commodity prices and revenues rise, and 
decrease spending when prices and revenue fall, amplifying 
unnecessarily the economy’s business cycle. 
Flowing as they normally do from just a handful of projects, the 
revenues are easily captured by an elite minority in government. 
The resulting income and wealth inequalities can be a source of 
tension and confl ict. 
In the extreme, resource revenues can provoke armed 
confl ict. They can provide authoritarian governments with 
the means to repress their citizens. They can fi nance pre-
existing confl icts. They can encourage separatist movements – 
especially where central governments siphon off revenues into 
national coffers, leaving little in the resource-rich province but 
resentment, as has happened in the DRC’s Katanga province 
and Nigeria’s Niger Delta. 
Close to 50 armed confl icts underway in 2001 had a strong 
link to natural resource exploitation.140 Seventeen civil wars 
took place over 1990-2002 linked to natural resources. Seven 
were in Africa — Angola (oil, diamonds), the Cabinda enclave 
of Angola (oil), the Republic of Congo (oil), the DRC (copper, 
coltan, diamonds, gold, cobalt), Liberia (timber, diamonds, 
iron, palm oil, cocoa, coffee, marijuana, rubber, gold), Sierra 
Leone (diamonds) and Sudan (oil).141
It is possible for a country to immunise itself against the 
Resource Curse by managing its earnings wisely – saving or 
‘sterilising’ them when the economy is booming; spending 
them mainly when the economy is slumping; spending them 
fairly; investing a considerable fraction for the day when the 
resource is exhausted; and shining a light of public scrutiny 
upon how the moneys are used.
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after the cabinet decision to establish the review, the government 
announced it would withdraw a production-sharing contract 
from US oil company Hyperdynamics and renegotiate a contract 
with Compagnie de Bauxite de Kindia (CBK), a local bauxite 
company run by Russian aluminium giant RUSAL.144 Again, 
in June 2008, Rio Tinto said that it had received a letter from 
the Guinean president's offi ce querying the validity of a decree 
issuing a mining concession over the Simandou iron ore deposit, 
estimated to cost US$6 billion to develop.145 One journalist 
speculated: ‘The possibility of the Government asking for more 
favourable terms, as Mongolia has done with Rio’s Oyo Tolgoi 
copper joint venture, cannot be discounted.’146
 
• Tanzania. In May 2006, the government began to update 
its mining legislation and review existing mining contracts 
in order to maximise returns from the mining industry. The 
update and review had been expected since at least June 2005, 
when Tanzania’s IMF-approved Poverty Reduction Strategy 
recommended ‘updating mining policy and legislation’. In 
May 2007, the government announced that it had reached 
agreement with gold mining companies to scrap some tax 
incentives. It said that it had completed negotiating new 
contracts with Barrick Gold and with Australia’s Resolute 
Mining, owner of the Golden Pride mine. It noted that all 
mining companies will now need to pay corporate tax, a 3% 
royalty fee, withholding taxes, stamp duty, annual rent, and 
application and preparation fees.147
• Mauritania. The new government that seized power in 
a 2005 coup disputed amendments to four oil production 
sharing contracts that Woodside had agreed with the previous 
government. The new government reportedly thought that the 
amendments tilted the benefi ts in Woodside’s favour by lowering 
the government’s profi t share, modifying the tax environment 
and increasing the length of the contract. Woodside resolved the 
during the 1990s when oil prices were much lower than now. 
The government estimates the renegotiations will take around 
three months, but most commentators think longer given the 
number of companies.142
• DRC. Around 60 mining agreements negotiated during the 
country’s civil war are currently subject to a government review. 
A draft report leaked in early November 2007 suggested that 38 
contracts would be amended, and 23 cancelled entirely. This 
immediately hit the share price of the companies identifi ed, 
including two Australian companies, Anvil Mining and Tiger 
Resources. Comments by the DRC’s vice-minister of mines at 
the recent Indaba mining conference have raised fears that the 
government will seek to renegotiate all mining agreements with 
a view to increasing its share of mineral revenues and profi ts.143
• Zambia. In January 2008, the government announced 
signifi cant revisions to its mining taxation policy, which will 
eliminate special ‘development agreements’ with mining 
companies struck when copper prices were at record lows. 
These agreements previously provided tax concessions and 
codifi ed fi scal terms. The new regime will reportedly see the 
introduction of a windfall tax and a variable profi t tax. It comes 
on top of a previously announced increase in mining royalties 
from 0.6% to 3%, a lift in company tax from 25% to 30%, 
and re-introduction of a 15% withholding tax on dividends. 
Major mining companies in Zambia and the Chamber of Mines 
have rejected the new tax regime, arguing that the DAs are 
still binding. They say the changes will increase the effective 
rate of taxation from 31.7% to 47%, which may be enough to 
undermine the fi nancial viability of some projects.
• Guinea. In April 2007, the Guinean government set up a special 
committee to fi nd ways to increase fi nancial returns from 
foreign investors. In an address on state television four days 
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Of 23 oil, gas and mining companies surveyed by Control Risks, a 
specialist risk consultancy, in 2002, more than half said that they had 
put off an otherwise attractive investment because of corruption. And 
of 32 ‘world-class’ mining companies surveyed by business advisory 
fi rm PricewaterhouseCoopers in 2001, 41% said they had refrained 
from investing or had withdrawn from an investment because of 
corruption.150
Will corruption become a bigger or smaller problem in future? There 
are some tentative signs that it could become smaller. 
Like many things in this world, corruption is governed by supply 
and demand. The supply comes from ‘corruptors’; the demand from 
‘corruptees’. If supply or demand, or both, diminish, so will the volume 
of corruption transacted in the political and commercial marketplace. 
On the supply side, anti-corruption laws are tightening, at least in 
OECD countries. 
• In 1997, the 29 OECD member states and fi ve others signed 
the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Offi cials in International Business Transactions. Signatories 
agreed to introduce laws making it a crime to bribe foreign 
offi cials.151 The Australian law was passed in June 1999 — the 
Criminal Code Amendment (Bribery of Foreign Public Offi cials) 
Act 1999. 
• In 2000, the OECD published Revised Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises that ‘provide voluntary principles 
and standards for responsible business conduct in a variety of 
areas including human rights, anti-corruption, taxation, labour 
relations, environment, information disclosure, and consumer 
protection’. Though not legally binding on companies from 
OECD member states, ‘The Australian Government is committed 
to promoting the use of the Guidelines’. More to the point, the 
Guidelines allow reporting to an ‘Australian National Contact 
Point (ANCP)’ of ‘specifi c instances’ of corporate behaviour 
believed to violate the Guidelines. The ANCP is the Executive 
dispute with the new government in 2006 by paying a settlement 
fee of almost $140 million and by agreeing to a pay an annual 
$1.4 million environmental bond.148 
Corruption
According to Transparency International’s (TI) 2007 Corruption 
Perceptions Survey, of the 52 African countries surveyed, 36 scored 
below ‘3’, suggesting that corruption is seen there as rampant, and 14 
scored ‘3-5’ indicating that corruption is seen as a serious challenge. 
Only two African countries scored above ‘5’, indicating that they were 
reasonably ‘clean’ — Botswana and South Africa.149 (For details on 
countries’ corruption rankings go to Appendix 2, Figure A2.3.)
Corruption is a particularly thorny issue for ethical companies to 
handle. It is often near-impossible to do business in a country with a 
corrupt government without being tainted. 
Life isn’t made any easier by the fact that the dividing line between 
illegal bribes and lawful ‘facilitation payments’ is often a fuzzy one. In 
some countries such as the UK the criminal code makes no distinction 
between the two. Facilitation payments are, however, permitted in 
Australia and America as long as they are disclosed.
In 1999 the British NGO Global Witness exposed the misuse of 
petrodollars by the Angolan government and complicity of foreign oil 
companies. Its report noted that the government was disclosing virtually 
nothing about its revenues or dealings with foreign companies. The 
NGO called on companies to ‘publish what you pay’ so that malfeasance 
would be either discouraged or immediately discovered. This call was 
taken up by other NGOs and culminated in 2003 in the launch of the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) by the then British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair.
Because of the sort of criticism received by the oil companies in 
Angola, many companies now rule out involvement with corruption 
point-blank. But this places them in a dilemma, because to do business 
in certain countries one has no choice but to deal with dishonest 
offi cials, middlemen or politicians. Small wonder then that corruption 
can often be a deal-breaker.
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Strategic competition
As Chapter 1 noted, concerns are beginning to surface that state-
owned and state-directed companies may be unfairly competing for 
concessions with profi t-driven private sector companies. For instance, 
Mikkal Herberg has remarked that ‘Though the major international oil 
companies are accustomed to intense competitive environments, some 
Asian NOCs appear to have important competitive advantages in what 
may increasingly become an uneven playing fi eld’.155
What are these advantages? They vary, but can include: a remit to secure 
resources without regard to profi t; soft loans; government offers of aid, trade 
preferences, infrastructure and defence cooperation in support of bids for 
licences and contracts; freedom from constraints like anti-corruption laws; 
and little scrutiny from the media, banks and shareholders.
• DRC. Some Western companies and NGOs are reportedly 
concerned that Beijing’s recent pledge of more than US$9 billion 
in concessional loans to the DRC (discussed in Chapter 1) could 
persuade the government in its current review of mining licences 
to transfer to China some licences held by smaller companies — 
despite Kinshasa’s assurances to the contrary.156 A group of NGOs 
have noted a 28 January decision by Kinshasa to transfer two mining 
concessions previously held by the Katanga Mining Company to 
China’s Sinohydro Corporation and the China Railway Engineering 
Corporation. ‘The organisations say that it is increasingly apparent 
that new deals are being struck behind closed doors … ’157 
• Gabon. Another instance where it is claimed that a state-owned 
company exercised an unfair advantage took place in 2005 — the 
Gabonese government directed Brazil’s CVRD (since renamed 
Vale) to re-bid for a mining permit in competition with a Chinese 
company; the Chinese company won.158
It remains an open question how big a threat such strategic competition 
will pose for Australian and other companies lacking state support. 
Although Herberg warns of unfair competition he arrives at a rosy 
Member of the Foreign Investment Review Board, who is also 
the General Manager of the Foreign Investment and Trade Policy 
Division at the Australian Treasury. Where the ANCP judges 
the instance to be ‘material and substantiated’, they will try to 
resolve it through conciliation or mediation.152
• In 2006, offi cial OECD ECAs agreed an Action Statement on 
Bribery and Offi cially Supported Export Credits. This requires 
companies using ECA fi nance and insurance facilities — often 
critical to closing deals in SSA — to make a ‘no engagement in 
bribery’ declaration.153 
In Australia, companies also have to pay heed to the corruption sections 
in the ASX’s corporate governance guidelines and the so-called CLERP9 
amendments to the Corporations Act. 
Together, the obligations imposed on companies by the OECD and 
by local laws have made it a lot harder for any company to pay bribes or 
do other corrupt things.154
One of the concerns about state-owned and -directed companies 
playing the New Great Game is that they could add to the supply of 
corruption even as it diminishes from the OECD. This is a development 
to watch.
On the demand side, ‘Africa is producing good results in the fi ght 
against corruption’, says TI. Even if it is happening from a low base, 
countries like Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa and Swaziland did 
score signifi cantly better in TI’s 2007 survey than previously. 
Sticking with the supply/demand metaphor: what is fairly clear is 
that the supply of corruption from OECD countries will decrease. It 
could, however, rise from non-OECD countries. Meanwhile, the demand 
for corruption may diminish, but any decline is likely to be slow, fi tful 
and patchy. If the demand for corruption doesn’t decline, and the non-
OECD supply increases, companies from OECD countries will fi nd 
themselves increasingly crowded out from business opportunities on 
the subcontinent. 
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Managing risk
How are companies — and their fi nanciers — managing the risks 
discussed above? Broadly speaking, in three ways: by being good 
corporate citizens, undertaking ‘constructive engagement’ with 
‘stakeholders’ to achieve ‘win-win outcomes’; by doing thorough 
political risk assessment; and by taking out political risk insurance.
Corporate social responsibility
Good corporate citizenship — or corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) as it has come to be called — is increasingly being viewed by 
companies as a way to win support — or at least grudging acceptance 
— from groups with the capacity to make trouble for them — NGOs, 
shareholder activists, the media, home country regulators, host country 
governments, local activists, local communities. As one commentator 
has remarked, CSR is a way to gain a ‘social licence to operate’.159 Or 
as the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), a body 
representing the world’s 16 largest mining companies, says: a stress 
on sustainable development will ‘best ensure continued access to land, 
capital and markets as well as build trust and respect’.160 
An extension of this viewpoint says that while Western companies 
cannot hope to match the incentives offered to African leaders by 
countries like China – pipelines, railways, roads and sports stadiums, 
not to mention cheap credit — they can offer something different, but 
equally compelling: high ethical, social and environmental standards. 
(Notice the parallel with the use of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power by nations 
to achieve foreign policy objectives.) During the last election in Zambia 
in 2006, the opposition leader, Michael Sata, boosted his appeal among 
voters by questioning the practices of Chinese investors in the mining 
industry, especially labour practices. A couple of months before the 
election campaign, six striking workers were shot during riots at a 
Chinese-owned copper mine, and a year earlier lax regulations were 
thought to have caused an explosion which killed around 40 workers 
at an explosives factory next to the mine.161 In Angola, the government 
decided in 2007 to cancel a contract to build an oil refi nery by China’s 
conclusion: over the long run self-interest and pressure from other 
countries will force Asia’s NOCs to adopt market-oriented norms. 
But as we have argued earlier in this chapter and in Chapter 1, the 
competition could heat up before cooling down.
Box 3: Additional, mistaken criticisms of state-directed investment
‘Unfair competition’ against Western resource companies isn’t 
the only charge that has been laid at the door of state-owned 
and -directed companies. We argue that while the issue of 
‘unfair competition’ is complex and the charge of unfairness 
isn’t always justifi ed, the phenomenon is a real, and arguably 
growing, one.
That can’t be said of another accusation — that state-
directed investment allows its perpetrators to ‘take supply off 
world markets’, maybe to the point of ‘cornering the market’. 
If a strategic investor decides to acquire ‘customer equity’ 
in an African mine or oilfi eld whose supplies it will then 
consume, it thereby saves itself the need to go onto the open 
market to buy such supplies. So the net effect on the market’s 
supply/demand balance is nil.
Could it ‘corner the market’? In other words, establish such 
a dominant position as producer that open market supplies to 
the rest of the world are restricted. Hypothetically: yes. But in 
that case it would be sorely tempted to supply its commodities 
to the open market to take advantage of the high price, thereby 
easing supply on the open market.
More to the point, if the strategic investor is undertaking 
uncommercial investment that would be spurned by a profi t-
motivated company, it is thereby adding to world supply, and 
all else equal, pushing the market price down, not up.
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Junior companies have fewer resources to do CSR and less investment 
to protect with CSR. Concentrating as they do on exploration, they 
also leave a smaller mark on their surroundings than majors investing 
in large development projects, and so have correspondingly smaller 
environmental and social obligations. Still, an increasing number of 
juniors now recognise that the value of their discovery can be signifi cantly 
reduced if surrounding communities are antagonistic. It is increasingly 
common for relatively small exploration outfi ts to have social specialists 
working on site to facilitate communications with local communities, 
manage expectations and promote good relations. The benefi ts that an 
investor can provide before a mine proceeds are limited, but the impacts 
from a large exploration exercise can be substantial — roads, camps and 
drilling can be extensive even for a relatively modest project – and poor 
mitigation work done at the outset can cause trouble later. 
Unethical junior companies might be tempted to neglect their social 
and environmental obligations and bribe offi cials. The proverbial 
unethical junior is Canada’s Bre-X, which ‘salted’ its Indonesian 
mine in 1997 in a bid to attract investors. There have also been cases 
in Africa. In Ghana, for instance, foreign investors have pressed the 
government to allow exploration and mining in forest reserves subject 
to a moratorium on such activities.166 But the number of companies 
tempted to cut ethical corners like this seems to be dwindling.
How do companies operating in Africa make a CSR policy? They can 
either make their own, or adopt principles from an ever-growing menu 
of standards, voluntary guidelines and codes sponsored by individual 
fi rms, multilateral bodies, industry bodies and NGOs.
Four prominent codes that companies look to for benchmarks of good 
corporate conduct in areas like human rights, the environment, ethical 
conduct and labour are the Equator Principles, the EITI, the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the ICMM’s Sustainable 
Development Principles.
• Equator Principles. Based on environmental and social 
standards from the International Finance Corporation (the World 
Bank’s private-sector fi nancing arm), the Equator Principles 
Sinopec. All these incidents suggest a dawning recognition among 
African governments that bids for contracts or offers of investment 
by countries playing the New Great Game, for all their attendant 
sweeteners, can have drawbacks.162
CSR policies differ from company to company. But generally, 
the bigger and better resourced the company, the more ambitious 
its policy. Most large companies have some code of conduct stating 
their commitment to preserving the environment, paying fair wages, 
respecting human rights, establishing safe working conditions, avoiding 
corruption, dealing fairly with stakeholders, and contributing to the 
local community. The big effort major companies put into CSR refl ects 
the large sums of money they stake for long periods — money it makes 
sense to go to some lengths to safeguard against political risk.
Publicly listed companies need to make a special effort because 
stock exchanges and institutional investors demand high standards 
of corporate governance. Shareholders will typically want assurance, 
for instance, that capital isn’t being recklessly gambled on investments 
at risk from expropriation, local community backlashes, lawsuits, 
consumer boycotts, negative publicity and the like. 
Another reason for a public company to take CSR seriously is the 
growing weight of money demanding ethical corporate behaviour. 
The socially responsible investment sector is still a small portion 
of the Australian sharemarket, with around A$21½ billion in total 
investments, of which $3.6 billion was in managed funds, in 2004. 
Still, an indication of how quickly the sector might grow comes from 
America, where socially responsible investment had quickly expanded 
to around 11% of all investment assets under professional management 
by 2003.163 Not only do these funds shun companies which they believe 
fall short of acceptable CSR benchmarks; they also criticise and sell out 
of companies they perceive to be backsliding. For instance, in 2001 a 
group of fund management companies managing between them £400 
billion issued a statement expressing concern about companies invested 
in Burma.164 And in 2002, the London- and ASX-listed Henderson Global 
Investors decided to withdraw its socially responsible investment funds 
from BP, out of concern with the company’s safety record in Alaska.165
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• NGO initiatives include the Global Sullivan Principles on Social 
Responsibility, the Global Reporting Initiative and the Voluntary 
Principles on Security and Human Rights.
• Industry initiatives include the International Cyanide 
Management Code for the Manufacture, Transport and Use of 
Cyanide in the Production of Gold.
• Standards Australia’s Standard AS 8001-2008 on fraud and 
corruption control.
Resource companies in Africa, especially the large ones, haven’t just 
adopted external benchmarks. They also fashion their own codes. A 
survey conducted in 2002 by the specialist risk consultancy Control 
Risks found that 94% of British and 92% of American companies 
surveyed had codes forbidding bribe payment.167 Industry sources 
suggest that the number would be similarly high in Australia.
Apart from general statements of principle, companies set themselves 
specifi c benchmarks in their environmental and social management 
plans for individual projects — the documents they present to host 
country governments to gain and maintain licences and to bankers 
to secure debt funding. Anvil Mining, for instance, allocates 10% of 
the profi ts from its Dikulushi copper/silver mine in the DRC to local 
community development. These plans are often audited by both 
governments and bankers. 
As already noted under ‘Corruption’ above, offi cial OECD ECAs 
have separately adopted an Action Statement on Bribery and Offi cially 
Supported Export Credits. They also take a common line towards 
environmental impact assessment of projects they fi nance. In 2007, 
they agreed to strengthen their environmental standards.168 
Political risk assessment
Many resource companies subject investment proposals to ‘country’ 
or political risk assessment, the better to manage their political risks. 
Majors like Shell and BHP Billiton have established in-house risk 
are a set of benchmarks adopted by 59 fi nancial institutions 
working on project fi nancing in developing countries, the ANZ, 
National Australia Bank and Westpac among them. They are fast 
becoming the benchmarks for resource projects seeking project 
fi nance, ECA support and PRI. 
• EITI. A fi scal transparency initiative, this calls upon companies 
to ‘publish what they pay’ and governments to ‘disclose what they 
receive’. Australian resource companies that have committed to 
EITI include BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto and Woodside.
• OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (and 
associated Risk Awareness Tool for Multinational 
Enterprises in Weak Governance Zones). These Guidelines 
are a set of voluntary recommendations to multinational 
companies on business ethics, including employment and 
industrial relations, human rights, environment, information 
disclosure, combating bribery, consumer interests, science and 
technology, competition, and taxation. In 2006, Anvil Mining 
commissioned an independent external audit of its DRC 
operations with reference to these two instruments. The auditor 
gave it an 82% mark — 100% being full compliance. 
• ICMM’s Sustainable Development Principles. The ICMM 
says it has developed a ‘badge of excellence’ for companies to 
demonstrate their credentials in ethics, environmental protection 
and safety. BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto and Pasminco have committed 
to measuring their performance against these Principles.
There are also many other guideposts. 
• Multilateral initiatives include the UN Global Compact, UN 
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations 
With Regard To Human Rights, and International Finance 
Corporation Performance Standards. 
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(Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency) and ATI (African Trade 
Insurance Agency).
None of these agencies supplies much information, either. Since its 
founding in 1988, MIGA says it has issued US$2.3 billion in guarantees 
for investments in Africa, supporting 90 projects ranging in size from 
less than US$1 million to more than US$1 billion, and spanning 27 
countries. But again, it does not divulge how much of this business was 
with the resource sector.
What risks do the PRI providers cover? The three risks they have 
traditionally covered are currency inconvertibility, expropriation and 
asset damage due to political violence. In recent years, however, many 
providers have increased the breadth of coverage to include: breach of 
contract, arbitral award default, unfair or wrongful calling of guarantees 
and performance bonds, forced divestiture or abandonment of assets, 
terrorism, and dishonouring of commodity hedge contracts because of 
political events.
Despite the data shortcomings, industry sources state that PRI 
coverage of African resource projects is extensive. Or rather, PRI 
coverage of the debt fi nancing and hedge facilities supplied by banks to 
projects is extensive. A surprisingly large number of equity investors 
choose to self-insure these risks. There seem to be two reasons for this. 
The major companies can reduce their overall portfolio risk by having a 
wide span of mineral and geographic exposures. Meanwhile, investors 
don’t necessarily want junior companies to hedge all their risks. To the 
contrary, so long as there is suffi cient prospective reward to compensate 
for the risk, they may actually urge companies to embrace risk. Then 
through careful selection of uncorrelated shares, investors can hedge 
the risk of specifi c companies, including political risks.
The importance of fairness
Ultimately, the best defence an investor can mount against political risk 
is to ensure a fair sharing of benefi ts between itself, the local community 
and the national government. 
There is still a tendency among some resource companies to haggle 
for all sorts of indemnities, warranties, tax holidays and stabilisation 
assessment capabilities. Their assessments can often be quite complex 
and comprehensive, involving techniques like scenario planning. Other 
companies hire consultants and subscribe to intelligence and analysis 
from research companies and institutes. As with CSR policies, the 
larger the company and the more it has to lose from political risk, the 
greater the tendency to invest in political risk assessment.
Companies generally evaluate political risks on both a project and 
portfolio basis. In other words, they evaluate the risk of loss on individual 
projects — and on the overall asset portfolio taking into account possible 
offsetting or reinforcing effects of a particular ‘risk event’.
Risks typically evaluated include: expropriation, political violence, 
currency inconvertibility and contract frustration. These are often 
given a numerical rating. These ratings, in turn, enable the company 
to calibrate its risk management parameters — things like hurdle 
rates of return, country exposure ceilings, gearing ratios, and risk 
mitigation strategies.
The ratings also guide the decision on whether to insure. If the 
expected loss (or worst expected loss) from a political risk event is 
judged to be bearable or non-catastrophic, and expensive to insure, a 
company may decide to self-insure. Then again, if the converse applies, 
the company may decide to seek political risk insurance.
Political risk insurance
To what extent do resource companies and their fi nanciers use political 
risk insurance (PRI) to cover the hazards of going into Africa?
The leading international organisation representing the export credit 
and investment insurance industry is the Berne Union. Despite its broad 
oversight, however, it doesn’t collect data by industry. At the end of 
2007, Berne Union members had a total PRI exposure to SSA of US$11.6 
billion.169 Much of this was reportedly to the resource sector, but there 
was a lot out to the telecom and infrastructure sectors as well.
The Berne Union consists of predominantly offi cial ECAs, though it 
does have some private sector members. Outside it, there is a big private 
sector PRI market, consisting of the Lloyd’s market and the corporate 
market. Then fi nally, there are two multilateral PRI providers — MIGA 
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the lowest price and best capabilities. You often have to do more than 
offer the highest price and fi rst rate capabilities to win an exploration 
or development permit. Just because you have a government licence or 
contract doesn’t mean it will always be honoured. You will sometimes 
be competing on unequal terms for concessions and contracts with 
state-backed companies.
From these facts it is possible to make the case that Canberra 
should provide some help to Australian companies to overcome the 
disadvantages they face — either from arbitrary or corrupt African 
governments or unfair competition from state-backed companies — 
insofar as it can do so effi ciently and effectively.
The policies that suggest themselves for review are foreign, trade and 
aid; and on a subsidiary level, positions in international organisations.
Foreign policy
Should the government re-open some diplomatic posts? And if so, where? 
At present, there are fi ve diplomatic posts in SSA: in Ghana, Kenya, 
Nigeria, South Africa and Zimbabwe (all Commonwealth or former 
Commonwealth members). These are all resource-rich countries in which 
Australian companies are active. But this coverage leaves out many other 
SSA countries, where activity has also been extensive, or promises to be. 
Notable instances are Mozambique, Zambia, the DRC and Guinea.
The chief advantage to having a diplomatic post is that it enables 
Canberra to carry on a dialogue with the SSA government over 
governance to complement and reinforce the one it is having with 
multilateral organisations. A post would also enable Australian 
diplomats to make representations on behalf of individual investors in 
cases where they were being discriminated against or otherwise treated 
unfairly or unlawfully.
Trade policy
Should Canberra negotiate BITs — bilateral investment treaties — 
with SSA countries? (They are also known as IPPAs — investment 
promotion and protection agreements.) Many investors from other 
countries rely on the BITs their governments have negotiated with host 
clauses to protect themselves. However, if this results in a one-sided 
contract, it should come as no surprise if the contract is challenged. At 
best, it will be renegotiated; at worst, the property will be nationalised.
What might fair shares look like? This hinges on the profi tability 
of the project, but World Bank investigations suggest that 45-55% is a 
typical ‘effective tax rate’ for a well-structured mining project.170
Anything too out of kilter with this benchmark or the country’s 
mining code could be a sign of trouble.
Implications for public policy
Another issue raised by the push of Australian resource companies into 
Africa is how public policy should respond.
Australian foreign, defence, trade and aid policies have traditionally 
focused upon Australia’s neighbourhood — the Asia/Pacifi c region — 
in recognition that this is where our major commercial and security 
interests lie. Africa was in policymakers’ peripheral vision, but no more 
than that.
Will that now have to change? The extent of Australian-African 
business links outlined in this report wouldn’t justify any wholesale 
change. Our traditional diplomatic, military, trade, investment and aid 
partners (and rivals) continue to loom largest. 
Nevertheless, there may be a case for some marginal recalibration.
We certainly aren’t arguing for a corporatist ‘Australia Inc’ approach 
to taking on Africa in the manner of other countries playing the New 
Great Game. As we noted earlier in this chapter — leaning on the 
arguments of Raghuram Rajan — this is an approach that isn’t in our 
commercial or broader national interest and is therefore likely to end in 
tears. (It is bad enough for a net mineral and energy importer to back its 
companies with subsidies. It would be especially misguided for a large 
exporter like Australia to do so.)
Still, an important feature of African life does need to be acknowledged: 
commerce is heavily politicised and subject to arbitrary government 
intervention. Fiscal, regulatory and contractual frameworks can shift 
abruptly. You don’t necessarily win a contract because you have offered 
INTO AFRICA
96 97
IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES AND PUBLIC POLICY
'national' (non-discriminatory) treatment of investors. Trying to give 
the aid program commercial as well as aid objectives risks undermining 
the program’s developmental impact. It mightn’t be very effective in 
achieving commercial objectives, either.
An exception to this rule is where an aid objective might also serve 
a commercial purpose. Encouraging and helping SSA governments 
to adopt better governance and anti-corruption programs is one such 
example of killing two birds with one stone. Better governance and less 
corruption relieve an important constraint on economic development 
and improve the investment climate for resource investors. 
In recognition of this, the government in 2006 donated A$250,000 
in aid money to the EITI.171 It is also encouraging the so-called OECD/
NEPAD Investment Initiative, under which the OECD is working with 
African governments in NEPAD — the New Partnership for African 
Development — to improve investment climates in their countries.
Could more be done along these lines? The aid agency AusAID is 
currently reviewing its African aid policy. It anticipates giving a greater 
focus to the delivery of ‘African aid’ through multilateral organisations. 
It believes that forming partnerships with international and regional 
institutions with an infl uential voice in Africa will do more to achieve 
important aid objectives like reaching the Millennium Development 
Goals than handing out money in bilateral penny packets.172 
Such a greater multilateral focus should also be of benefi t to Australia’s 
commercial interests in the SSA resource sector because it will give 
Canberra a greater voice in forums encouraging good governance. 
A fi nal point to consider is whether, again at the margin, AusAID 
should hand out more bilateral aid to SSA of the traditional kind that 
supports development and poverty alleviation. There could be goodwill 
to be had from such a gesture — goodwill that serves the government 
well when it comes to talking about Australia’s commercial interests. 
Scope might exist to accommodate a modest and focused increase in 
African aid while attending to the needs of traditional aid partners, 
since the aid program is currently being scaled up to reach ½% of gross 
national income by 2015 from 0.3% in 2007-08. This is hardly a new 
idea: such ‘enlightened self-interest’ informs the whole aid program.
country governments to give them guarantees of equal treatment with 
other investors, compensation for any expropriation, freedom to make 
income remittances and capital repatriations, and access to independent 
dispute settlement. 
At present, Australia has no BIT with an SSA country. It has 20 
BITs, but the closest one to SSA is Egypt. In recent times, Canberra 
has been negotiating investment chapters in its FTAs. These chapters 
contain all the investment protections normally found in a BIT, but 
again no Australian FTA is with SSA.
Before the government would consider entering a BIT with another 
government, two things would need to happen. Industry would normally 
have to make representations to the government stating the case for a BIT. 
And the government would need to be satisfi ed that the other country 
was willing to negotiate a high-quality treaty. (Some governments might 
shy away from a BIT, fearing that it would restrict their freedom to make 
policy or open the door to a fl ood of arbitration).
These circumstances hardly make BITs with SSA inevitable, but nor 
do they rule them out. It is quite conceivable that an African BIT or two 
could be negotiated over the next few years if the trends we describe in 
this paper continue.
As an aside, note that even if no BIT with SSA does eventuate, it may 
still be possible for some dual-listed Australian resource companies to take 
advantage of the BITs other governments have negotiated. Thus, BHP 
Billiton and Rio Tinto with their London listings may be able to avail 
themselves of British BITs; and companies with Toronto listings, Canadian 
BITs. Both the UK and Canada have numerous BITs with SSA.
Aid policy
Should the government allocate more aid to SSA? What types of aid 
should it consider?
As a general principle, it is bad public policy to try to use the foreign 
aid program to advance Australia’s commercial interests. Good public 
policy is about horses for courses — aid policy for relieving development 
constraints and reducing poverty in poor countries, commercial policy 
for achieving commercial interests like gaining market access or 
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• OECD. In the OECD, 35 countries are parties to an ‘Arrangement 
on Guidelines for Offi cially Supported Export Credits’ – Australia, 
Canada, European Union countries, Japan, South Korea, New 
Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the United States. The 
Arrangement places limitations on the terms and conditions of 
offi cially supported export credits (eg. minimum interest rates, 
risk fees and maximum repayment terms) and the provision of 
tied aid. Pricing one’s export credits, credit guarantees and credit 
insurance below the stipulated minimum rates is a derogation 
from the Arrangement and must be reported.173 The aim of the 
Arrangement is to have exporters compete on price and quality, 
not on the credit terms their governments can provide. Except 
for Korea and perhaps Japan, the countries engaging in strategic 
competition for SSA resources aren’t parties to the Arrangement. 
Nevertheless, under an outreach program the OECD is trying to 
bring non-OECD export credit providers into the Arrangement. 
In July, it signed a pact with Brazil to limit government support 
for export deals involving civil aircraft – Brazil being a major 
exporter of such aircraft.174
• WTO. The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures contains a broad prohibition on the use of export 
subsidies, including provision of export credit at below-market 
rates. Under the agreement, a country can use the WTO’s 
dispute settlement procedure to seek withdrawal of a subsidy or 
removal of its adverse effects. Or the country can launch its own 
investigation and ultimately charge extra duty (‘countervailing 
duty’) on subsidised imports found to be hurting domestic 
producers.175 
• Berne Union. The Berne Union recently agreed a series of 
Guiding Principles setting out values common to its members. 
Though non-binding and somewhat vague, the principles do urge 
careful risk management, sound business practice, cost recovery 
and transparency – the anthithesis of the way the New Great 
International organisations  
Should Australia’s representatives on the IMF and World Bank boards 
and in the UN, OECD and WTO speak out more during African 
discussions and matters with an African angle? 
 They already do urge countries to adopt the EITI and other 
benchmarks of good governance. And especially on the Fund and 
Bank boards where there is leverage to do so because of the credit 
they extend, our directors also speak up on behalf of macroeconomic 
stabilisation policies and structural, trade, legal and regulatory reform 
— all things that improve the business and investment climate for 
resource investors.
Should our representatives seek only to infl uence African 
governments in broad terms — to improve economic management and 
regulation, security, rule of law and the like? Or should they also seek to 
support individual companies facing corruption, discrimination, unfair 
competition and arbitrary treatment? 
Support for individual companies is more a job for a diplomatic post 
— with one proviso. Where some act of an SSA government has put 
an Australian company at a disadvantage, it may be appropriate for 
the multilateral representative to remind the government concerned 
what the alternative better policy is — giving every company full and 
equal access in a competitive market to all licences and contracts; 
establishing fi scal, legal, regulatory and contractual conditions that are 
stable, yet responsive to project profi tability; establishing terms in line 
with international norms; adhering to due process etc. The point is that 
the representative would be urging good policy that is in the country’s 
national interest, not lobbying for a particular company.
A fi nal area worth looking at is the leverage – or infl uence – that 
might be exerted on governments playing the New Great Game to 
scale back their credit and investment subsidies. This might be done 
in three bodies – the OECD, the WTO and the Berne Union. In each 
organisation members have taken on commitments not to distort trade 
by offering subsidised export credits (though in the Berne Union, the 
commitments are non-binding ones). 
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As for public policy, all the policy options outlined above need 
careful examination. All entail drawbacks as well as advantages. Even 
if no drawbacks are obvious, there is always the opportunity cost of the 
resources deployed. For instance, negotiators redeployed to negotiating 
BITs can’t be used in multilateral or bilateral trade talks. Still, it would 
seem to be worth examining the trade-offs to see if there are any big results 
to be gained in Africa at the expense of less important goals elsewhere. 
Boiling it all down, the message to resource companies is: be a good 
corporate citizen and a serious political risk assessor. Consider PRI to 
cover possible catastrophic loss.
For the government? Companies have to take the risks they face more 
or less as given, whereas governments have some scope to infl uence the 
risk environment for the better. 
How? Through greater political and diplomatic support for 
companies facing specifi c problems on the subcontinent; and through 
BITs, targeted bilateral aid, and stronger advocacy for good African 
governance in multilateral organisations. All of these initiatives can, 
at least at the margin, foster better investment climates and fairer deals 
for individual investors.
Then there are a set of initiatives the government might consider 
to elicit better behaviour from state-backed companies able to compete 
unfairly for concessions and contracts. These initiatives are essentially 
about persuading governments to sign up to international rules and 
principles limiting credit and investment subsidies (and if that doesn’t 
work, there is the alternative to consider: challenging some of the 
subsidies in the WTO).
Game is played. Moreover, the Berne Union, unlike the OECD, 
includes many of the offi cial ECAs that subsidise export credit.
Success in persuading governments to limit their subsidies won’t come 
easy given the seeming determination of certain governments to use such 
subsidies as a lever to secure mineral and petroleum concessions. Then 
again, there could be the occasional breakthrough, as the agreement 
between Brazil and the OECD over civil aircraft noted above illustrates. 
And because such successes can pay big dividends, a review of this area 
of policy does seem warranted.
Conclusions
Australian resource companies aren’t innocents abroad when it comes 
to handling political risk. They have been investing in challenging 
countries for decades before the SSA resource boom came along — in 
countries like Indonesia, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea and the 
Solomon Islands. Over that time they have sustained their fair share of 
losses and gained the experience that comes with that.
Still, in SSA they are likely to encounter some risks they are unaccustomed 
to. Competition from state-owned and state-directed companies that have 
the exchequers and diplomatic clout of their governments behind them is 
one. This risk is largely unmanageable and uninsurable.
The cluster of issues that greets ‘good companies in bad countries’ — 
political violence, corruption, human rights abuses and intense public 
scrutiny — is another. These risks — often summed up as ‘reputational 
risk’ — are not confi ned to the subcontinent, but are prevalent there.
So far, no Australian company has suffered a political risk-related 
loss of the order of the Bougainville mine closure in Papua New Guinea 
in 1989. But such a loss is thinkable. Embedding CSR practices and 
political risk assessment into company policies, and taking out PRI to 
cover catastrophic loss, are arguably the best precautions companies 
can take against such large losses. 
Above all, negotiate fair agreements with the host country government 
and the local community.
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Sub-Saharan Africa’s resource potential
Although Africa is currently enjoying strong demand for mineral and 
petroleum exports and an infl ux of investment, this wasn’t always so: 
the SSA resource sector has had a troubled history and has suffered 
relative decline over the last two decades. As a result, its share of current 
worldwide production is modest and, for most mineral commodities at 
least, sharply lower than what it was four decades ago. Too frequently, 
SSA countries have failed to translate resource riches into higher 
production and durable economic growth. 
This appendix elaborates upon three aspects of the region’s resource 
potential
• Extensive mineral and oil endowments
• Modest-declining shares of world mineral production until 
recently, though with some prospect of a pick-up
• Resource dependence.
Extensive mineral and oil endowments
SSA is richly endowed with minerals, ranking fi rst or second for 
reserves of minerals such as diamonds, bauxite, gold and cobalt.176 
INTO AFRICA
104 105
APPENDIX 1
Modest international market shares
Although the SSA resource base may be rich and large, production 
lags badly. In minerals, apart from two standout examples, cobalt and 
diamonds, SSA's share of world production is modest (Table A1.2). Even 
for cobalt and diamonds, the sub-continent's share of world production 
has been trending down, especially in the last 10-15 years.182
Table A1.2: Africa’s Share of Global Production, 2005
Resource 
Share
(% world production)
General trend
(1963-2005)
Diamonds 52 Down
Cobalt 59 Down
Copper 5 Down
Gold 22 Down
Oil 7 Up
Composite1 7 Down2
Source: British Geological Survey.1 Un-weighted average share of output of six metals (gold, 
copper, zinc, iron ore, nickel, lead) from World Bank (2006)2 1990-2005
The decline in SSA's share of world production is most pronounced in 
copper, where it has fallen sharply since the early 1960s (Figure A1.1). 
These days, Chilean mines are the No. 1 suppliers, producing more 
than a third of world output.183
The subcontinent also has a substantial share of the world’s proven 
petroleum reserves177 (Table A1.1). 
Table A1.1: Africa’s resource wealth
Resource
Africa’s share
(% of world 
reserves)
Main countries
Platinum 88 South Africa
Diamonds 56 DRC, South Africa, Botswana
Cobalt 41 DRC, Zambia
Gold 40 South Africa
Bauxite 27 Guinea
Iron ore 15*
South Africa, Mauritania, 
Guinea, Liberia
Oil 10 Nigeria, Libya
Source: US Geological Survey; Department of Minerals and Energy (South Africa); BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy.* Based on fi gures compiled by MBendi (excludes South 
Africa) and reported by the African Iron and Steel Association.178
SSA's signifi cant mineral deposits are clustered in central and southern 
regions, with the DRC, Botswana, South Africa and Zambia standing out 
(Table A1.1). The Kasai diamond belt in the DRC alone is estimated to 
have around 27% of the world’s diamonds and the country’s Katanga 
province more than one-third of the world’s cobalt.179 South Africa is 
estimated to have around 40% of the world’s gold and almost all the 
world’s platinum reserves.180 Outside these superstars, Africa also has 
signifi cant reserves of copper, uranium, iron ore, nickel and manganese.
Sizeable oil deposits occur in the Gulf of Guinea, with Nigeria 
claiming the largest reserves, followed by Angola, Equatorial Guinea 
and Gabon (Table A1.1). Smaller, but still signifi cant, oil deposits exist 
in countries such as Sudan. East Africa is believed to have substantial 
reserves of recoverable oil, although they remain highly speculative. 
Nigeria has sizeable proven reserves of natural gas.181 
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1960s, Africa’s share of diamond and cobalt production recovered in 
the early to mid-1990s. By 2005, Africa was producing around 55% of 
the world’s cobalt and around 52% of the world’s diamonds. 
The cobalt recovery is largely due to a substantial increase in DRC 
production since 2001 on the back of improving security and the entry 
of foreign mining companies. As impressive as this recovery is, however, 
it only takes Africa’s share back to where it was in the mid-1980s. The 
current share is a far cry from the virtual dominance through the 1960s 
and early 1970s. 
The diamond recovery comes from expanding production in Botswana 
and an easing of the government’s direct control over diamond mining 
and export in the DRC.185 Again, while impressive, the recovery has 
only brought Africa’s world share back to its 1986 level. 
Resource dependence 
In many African countries, mining and oil production is often the main 
source of export earnings or fi scal revenues. Even in those countries 
lacking a substantial formal sector, income from the informal, or 
artisanal, sector supports a signifi cant proportion of the population.186 
This wasn’t always so. In the mid-1960s, two African countries — 
Zambia and the then Belgian Congo (renamed Zaire in 1965 and now 
the DRC) produced 20% of the world’s copper. In 1965, Zambia was 
among the world’s largest producers of copper ore, accounting for 
around 14%184 of the world’s output, most of it from the rich ore belt in 
the country’s north. The DRC was also a substantial copper producer, 
with a world output share of 6%. Copper production in both countries, 
however, was severely damaged through a combination of statist 
economic policies, corruption, and in the DRC, civil war. 
The slight uptick in Africa’s share of world copper production since 
2000 largely refl ects the recovery in Zambia’s copper industry. After 
several abortive attempts, the country’s copper industry was opened up 
to foreign involvement, resulting in substantial infl ows. 
SSA's declining share of world gold production is almost entirely 
due to falling production in South Africa, the sub-continent’s largest 
producer since the early 1960s and also the world’s largest gold producer. 
In recent years, South African gold miners have curtailed expansion 
plans and closed some mines in the face of rising production costs and 
a stronger exchange rate. 
Diamonds and cobalt are two exceptions to the typical modesty of 
Africa’s world production share. After dropping steadily from the mid-
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Table A1.4: Resource share in government revenues, selected 
countries, 2000-2005
Resource share of fi scal revenues
(% total fi scal revenue)
Countries
80% or more
Libya
Equatorial Guinea
Angola
50%-80%
Gabon
Nigeria
Botswana
Algeria
10%-50%
Guinea
Cameroon
Chad
Less than 10% Namibia
Source: IMF (2007)
Some countries, such as Sierra Leone, and Guinea (and further 
north, Algeria), earn almost all of their export income from energy or 
minerals (Table A1.3). Even in South Africa, the continent’s largest 
and most diversifi ed economy, minerals are a substantial source of 
export earnings. 
Table A1.3: Resource export earnings, selected countries, 
2000-2005
Resource export 
share 
(% total goods 
export values)
Countries Main resource exports
80% or more Algeria
Libya
Sierra Leone
Botswana
Republic of Congo
Gabon
Guinea
Equatorial Guinea
Chad
Petroleum
Petroleum
Diamonds
Diamonds, copper, nickel
Oil
Petroleum, manganese
Bauxite, alumina, gold,
     diamonds 
Petroleum
Petroleum
50%–80% Mauritania
Namibia
Zambia
DRC
Iron ore
Diamonds, uranium, gold, zinc
Copper, cobalt
Diamonds, cobalt, copper
Less than 50% South Africa
Ghana
Cameroon
Gold, diamonds
Gold
Petroleum
Source: IMF 
In some countries, mining and petroleum are the chief sources of 
government revenue (Table A1.4).
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Benchmarking Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
investment climates 
Africa is a continent, not a country. Resource investors face a patchwork 
of economic and political risks, with substantial variation both across 
and within countries. 
This appendix compares risk in 20 resource-rich African countries, 
as well as fi ve competing resource investment destinations outside Africa 
— Indonesia, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, Russia and Venezuela. 
('Resource-rich' countries are ones in Tables 1 (hydrocarbon-rich) 
and 2 (mineral-rich) in Appendix 1 of the IMF’s Guide on Resource 
Revenue Transparency.)
The comparison shows:
• Most resource-rich African countries have low levels of economic 
and social development. Although some countries might appear 
to be ‘middle-income’ based on per capita GDP — for example, 
Gabon and Equatorial Guinea — they typically have wide income 
and wealth inequalities and low Human Development Index 
(HDI) scores. The HDI combines measures of four things — life 
expectancy, adult literacy, school/university enrolment and per 
capita GDP. See Table A2.1.
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Table A2.1: Economic and social indicators
GDP 
(US$b, current 
prices)
GDP 
(per capita US$, 
current prices)
HDI Rank 
(2005)
Russia 984.9 6,897 67
Indonesia 364.2 1,640 107
South Africa 255.3 5,376 121
Venezuela 181.6 6.736 74
UAE 163.3 38,613 39
Nigeria 116.5 777 158
Algeria 113.9 3,400 104
Libya 50.4 8,449 56
Angola 45.2 2,847 162
Sudan 37.4 1,034 147
Cameroon 18.3 999 144
Ghana 12.9 602 135
Zambia 10.9 921 165
Botswana 10.6 6,756 124
Gabon 9.6 6,835 119
Equatorial Guinea 8.6 7,319 127
DRC 8.5 144 168
Congo 7.7 2,227 139
Chad 6.4 687 170
Namibia 6.3 3,085 125
PNG 5.6 945 145
Mongolia 3.2 1,217 114
Guinea 3.1 329 160
Mauritania 2.7 938 137
Sierra Leone 1.4 254 177
Liberia 0.6 172 _
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database (September 2007) and UNDP
• Country risk ratings suggest that many resource-rich African 
countries are at high risk of external and sovereign debt default. 
The OECD rates many countries in the region as either six or 
seven out of seven for default risk, the lowest category. Only 
20 African countries are covered by the ratings agencies — 
Botswana, Namibia and South Africa are rated investment grade 
while the rest tend to be assigned speculative grades. See Figure 
A2.1 and Table A2.2.
• World Bank governance indicators show that the governance 
framework of most resource-rich African countries is severely 
backward by international standards. However, South Africa, 
Botswana, Namibia and Ghana tend to have percentile rankings 
on each of the six aspects (voice and accountability, political 
stability/absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law and control of corruption) much higher than 
their regional counterparts, sometimes putting them in the top 
50% of countries worldwide. See Figures A2.2.1–A2.2.6.
• Resource-rich African countries tend to perform relatively 
poorly on most respected indicators of perceived corruption. 
See Figure A2.3.
• Sixteen African countries are EITI candidates. See Table A2.3.
• Zambia, Botswana, Namibia and Ghana rank highly on the 
Fraser Institute’s mineral and policy potential indexes. Note, 
however, that the survey was probably completed before the 
announcement of signifi cant changes to Zambia’s mining taxation 
regime in January, which have worsened the investment climate. 
See Figure A2.4.
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Table A2.2: Sovereign credit ratings
S&P Moody's Fitch
Algeria – – –
Angola – – –
Botswana A A2 –
Cameroon B – B
Chad – – –
Congo – – –
DRC – – –
Equatorial Guinea – – –
Gabon – – BB-
Ghana B+ – B+
Guinea – – –
Indonesia BB- Ba3 BB-
Liberia – – –
Libya – – –
Mauritania – – –
Mongolia BB- – B+
Namibia – – BBB-
Nigeria BB- – BB-
PNG B+ B1 B+
Russia BBB+ Baa2 BBB+
Sierra Leone – – –
South Africa BBB+ Baa1 BBB+
Sudan – – –
Venezuela BB- – BB-
Zambia – – –
Source: Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch. Note: Current at 1 May 2008
Figure A2.1
OECD country risk grades
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Source: OECD. Current at 16 May 2008.
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Figure A2.2.1
Source: “Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006” by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo
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Figure A2.2.2
Source: “Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006” by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo.
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Figure A2.2.3
Source: “Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006” by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo.
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Figure A2.2.4
Source: “Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006” by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo.
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Figure A2.3
Transparency International corruption perceptions index
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Source:  Transparency International
Note:  The Corruption Perceptions Index is a composite index of 12 surveys implemented by 
international bodies and institutions.  The scale ranges from 0 to 10 (highly corrupt to highly clean) 
but has been truncated to 6 here for presentational convenience. Data are for 2007.
Figure A2.2.5
Source: “Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006” by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo.
N
o
r
m
a
l
i
z
e
d
 
r
u
l
e
 
o
f
 
l
a
w
 
i
n
d
e
x
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3 HIGH
LOW
Rule of law
Figure A2.2.6
Source: “Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006” by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo.
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Table A2.3: EITI status
Candidate countries
African Other
Cameroon Azerbaijan
Congo (Rep) Kazakhstan
DRC Kyrgyzstan
Cote D'Ivoire Mongolia
Equatorial Guinea Peru
Gabon Timor-Leste
Ghana Yemen
Guinea
Liberia
Madagascar
Mali
Mauritania
Niger
Nigeria
Sao Tome and Principe
Sierra Leone
Source: EITI Secretariat. Current at 16 May 2008 
Figure A2.4
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0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Botswana
Ghana
Namibia
Zambia
Russia
South Africa
DRC
PNG
Venezuela
Mongolia
Indonesia
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Ghana
Namibia
Zambia
Botswana
PNG
DRC
Indonesia
Russia
South Africa
Mongolia
Venezuela
Policy potential
Mineral potential
Source: Fraser Institute. Data are for 2007/2008.
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